Former Governor Mike Huckabee (R-AR) has had a tough time of it when it comes to his foreign policy comments. Following the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Huckabee said
"In light of what happened in Pakistan yesterday, it's interesting that there are more Pakistanis who have illegally crossed the border than of any other nationality except for those immediately south of our border."
While he attributed his source on the number of illegal Pakistani immigrants to the "CIA and immigration numbers," CNN reported that "the number of illegal immigrants from Pakistan deported or apprehended is not mentioned in the latest report from the Department of Homeland Security/Office of Immigration Statistics. In 2005, the nation did not make the list of the top 10 sources of illegal immigrants. The previous year, Pakistan was the last country listed, but no specific numbers were given."
He compounded his error by referring to Pakistan's "continued" state of martial law despite Musharraf's lifting of it roughly two weeks earlier.
He also referred to Musharraf not having "enough control of those eastern borders near Afghanistan to be able go after the terrorists," despite the fact that Pakistan's eastern border is with India.
Earlier, Huckabee admitted not being aware of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran and faced criticism for his response to questions on it.
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The Republican Party establishment doesn't like Huckabee. They don't like his foreign policy gaffes but, perhaps more importantly for them, they don't like his position on taxes. The Weekly Standard poked fun at Huckabee's article in Foreign Affairs where he wrote of the need to "keep your friends close and your enemies closer," and attributed the quote to Sun-tzu. Wrote the Standard's Dean Barnett, "the only problem with citing this ancient piece of wisdom is that it comes not from Sun Tzu, but Michael Corleone. Unfortunately, the rest of Huckabee's essay was silent as to what America should do about Hyman Roth and his Sicilian message boy, Johnny Ola."
Attribution aside (and was Barnett's tongue-in-cheek?), Barnett's comment clearly indicates the low regard Republican economic conservatives have for Huckabee (here, here,
and here). One commentator even said nominating Huckabee would be "suicide" for the Republican Party given, among other things, "his tax-raising history in Arkansas."
****
Yet despite it all, Huckabee remains in a strong position in Iowa. An LA Times/Bloomberg News poll from earlier in the week has him ahead of Romney 37% to 23% (plus or minus 6%).
Based on this, at least, potential voters don't seem too distressed by his lack of foreign policy knowledge. Perhaps their support of him is similar to that of then-candidate Bush who, in 2000, reportedly said to Saudi Prince Bandar bin-Sultan, "I don’t have the foggiest idea about what I think about foreign policy."
If so, given what we've lived through these past seven years, they really ought to think again.
Saturday, December 29, 2007
Candidate Biden's Plan for Iraq
Following the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, several presidential candidates moved quickly to cite their knowledge and experience as evidence of their abilities to handle such a foreign policy crisis. Among them was presidential candidate and Senator Joe Biden (D-DE). The NY Times reported on how he underlined "his foresight by noting that he had long called Pakistan 'the most dangerous nation on the planet.'" He also mentioned a letter he and other senators had sent to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in October, "urg[ing] President Musharraf to provide better security for Ms. Bhutto and other political leaders – I wrote him before her return and after the first assassination attempt in October. The failure to protect Ms. Bhutto raises a lot of hard questions for the government and security services that must be answered."
Prior to this, however, Biden co-authored with Senator Brownback (R-KS) an amendment calling for "a political settlement in Iraq based upon the principles of federalism."
Although some termed the amendment as a proposal to partition Iraq (including the Administration via the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), Biden strongly disputed that characterization, writing
"the Biden-Brownback amendment does not call for the partition of Iraq. To the contrary, it calls for keeping Iraq together by bringing to life the federal system enshrined in its Constitution. Partition, or the complete break-up of Iraq, is something wholly different than federalism. A federal Iraq is a united Iraq, but one in which power is devolved to regional governments with a limited central government responsible for protecting Iraq's borders and oil distribution. It leaves the door open for stronger unity if and when passions cool, as we're seeing in the Balkans. Nor does the amendment call for dividing Iraq along sectarian lines. Rather, it calls for helping Iraqis implement their own Constitution, which provides for any of Iraq's 18 provinces to form regions and sets out the extensive powers of those regions and the limited powers of the central government. The result could be three regions, or four or five or more. It will be up to the Iraqi people."
****
Despite his efforts to control the interpretation, "partition" was exactly how many viewed the amendment's outcome, were it to be adopted by Iraqis (Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution: "it is time to do what Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and a majority of his fellow senators have been pushing of late: Build on . . . local progress by advising Iraqis to consider a form of federalism or, as we call it more bluntly, a soft partition of Iraq.").
But why would Biden and others attempt to intervene in what should be an internal Iraqi decision on its governmental structure? As Michigan University professor Juan Cole sees it, "first they messed up Iraq by authorizing Terrible George to blow it up, now they want to further mess it up by dividing it. It makes no sense to me; the US Senate doesn't even have the authority to divide Iraq. Wouldn't that be for the Iraqi parliament?"
From Biden's perspective, while the decision "will be up to the Iraqis. . . the idea that the United States -- with 160,000 troops in Iraq, 3,804 dead and nearly 28,000 wounded -- does not have a right and responsibility to voice its views and to push for a political settlement is absurd."
Yet others have termed the amendment as "cynical and dangerous." Stephen Zunes, of Foreign Policy in Focus, said "[w]hereas most Iraqis calling for a federal system advocate a bottom-up process based on geography as a means to counter the threat of a return to dictatorship in Baghdad, the Senate plan constitutes a top-down solution from the outside based on ethnicity and religion."
Or, as Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs argued, "where the senators made their big mistake was in focusing on federalism instead of constitutional revision. This is where there is room for the 'grand settlement' (including features related to federalism) which the senators so clearly want. This is also where such 'settlement' can be sought without violating the Iraqi constitution, because the process of revision itself is constitutionally mandated."
He added, "the procedures for implementing federalism in Iraq, consisting of the Iraqi constitution and the detailed legislation adopted in October 2006, unequivocally assert that (1) no federalization can start before April 1, 2008; (2) any new federal regions should come as the result of popular grassroots initiatives in the existing governorates; and (3) there is no imperative for every governorate in Iraq to opt for a federal status (theoretically, the number of new federal regions may be anywhere from zero to 15).
Biden's plan either violates all three of these aspects of the Iraqi legal framework or it has no meaning it all."
****
The Biden amendment seems to assume that sectarian "cleansing" has accelerated the movement toward de-facto partition and he's simply acknowledging that development: "the amendment will not produce 'bloodshed and suffering' in Iraq. It is hard to imagine more bloodshed and suffering than we've already seen, which has been exacerbated by the failure of Iraq's leaders to stop sectarian violence and produce a durable, widely accepted political settlement. More than 4 million Iraqis have already fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate now of 100,000 every month. The whole purpose of my amendment is to end that bloodshed and suffering by promoting a power sharing arrangement that meets the interests of all Iraqis and gives them more local control over their daily lives."
But, apart from violating Iraq's constitution and ignoring its citizens in attempting to impose a political settlement from both above and outside, Biden's plan for Iraq would essentially legitimize militias and criminal enterprise. Roger Owen, Harvard professor of Middle East history, likens the situation to that "of Lebanon during its own civil war, there were enough economic resources scattered around the country for local warlords who controlled them to maintain their own loyal militias and civilian constituencies without having to reply on the leadership's financial support."
Or perhaps, as Gen. Petraeus said, of the situation in southern Iraq, "occasionally folks have said that this is -- I don't know -- a little like the Italian city-states in Machiavelli's day or something like that. But there's an awful lot of to-ing and fro-ing."
The forces arrayed against a unified Iraq are, of course, many: Kurdish autonomy, Shia militias, Sunni tribes, and any number of criminal enterprises, not to mention external state influences, all struggling for influence and power over others. Clearly, there is no one, simple solution that will tidy up and bring near-term resolution to a murky and multi-faceted problem.
As the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, put it, "Iraq is a federal state. The constitution says so. One of the challenges the Iraqis face right now is trying to work out what that actually means translated beyond the constitution into law and into practice. . . It's a work in progress."
Does Biden's proposal reflect his deep understanding of foreign affairs? Certainly, that is his claim as a candidate for the presidency. But his plan is driven by a desire, first and foremost, "to bring our troops home without leaving chaos behind." Yet it is unlikely, given the issues discussed above, that "federalizing" Iraq would provide stability. It more likely would intensify and exacerbate the power struggles already inflaming the country.
Prior to this, however, Biden co-authored with Senator Brownback (R-KS) an amendment calling for "a political settlement in Iraq based upon the principles of federalism."
Although some termed the amendment as a proposal to partition Iraq (including the Administration via the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), Biden strongly disputed that characterization, writing
"the Biden-Brownback amendment does not call for the partition of Iraq. To the contrary, it calls for keeping Iraq together by bringing to life the federal system enshrined in its Constitution. Partition, or the complete break-up of Iraq, is something wholly different than federalism. A federal Iraq is a united Iraq, but one in which power is devolved to regional governments with a limited central government responsible for protecting Iraq's borders and oil distribution. It leaves the door open for stronger unity if and when passions cool, as we're seeing in the Balkans. Nor does the amendment call for dividing Iraq along sectarian lines. Rather, it calls for helping Iraqis implement their own Constitution, which provides for any of Iraq's 18 provinces to form regions and sets out the extensive powers of those regions and the limited powers of the central government. The result could be three regions, or four or five or more. It will be up to the Iraqi people."
****
Despite his efforts to control the interpretation, "partition" was exactly how many viewed the amendment's outcome, were it to be adopted by Iraqis (Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution: "it is time to do what Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and a majority of his fellow senators have been pushing of late: Build on . . . local progress by advising Iraqis to consider a form of federalism or, as we call it more bluntly, a soft partition of Iraq.").
But why would Biden and others attempt to intervene in what should be an internal Iraqi decision on its governmental structure? As Michigan University professor Juan Cole sees it, "first they messed up Iraq by authorizing Terrible George to blow it up, now they want to further mess it up by dividing it. It makes no sense to me; the US Senate doesn't even have the authority to divide Iraq. Wouldn't that be for the Iraqi parliament?"
From Biden's perspective, while the decision "will be up to the Iraqis. . . the idea that the United States -- with 160,000 troops in Iraq, 3,804 dead and nearly 28,000 wounded -- does not have a right and responsibility to voice its views and to push for a political settlement is absurd."
Yet others have termed the amendment as "cynical and dangerous." Stephen Zunes, of Foreign Policy in Focus, said "[w]hereas most Iraqis calling for a federal system advocate a bottom-up process based on geography as a means to counter the threat of a return to dictatorship in Baghdad, the Senate plan constitutes a top-down solution from the outside based on ethnicity and religion."
Or, as Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs argued, "where the senators made their big mistake was in focusing on federalism instead of constitutional revision. This is where there is room for the 'grand settlement' (including features related to federalism) which the senators so clearly want. This is also where such 'settlement' can be sought without violating the Iraqi constitution, because the process of revision itself is constitutionally mandated."
He added, "the procedures for implementing federalism in Iraq, consisting of the Iraqi constitution and the detailed legislation adopted in October 2006, unequivocally assert that (1) no federalization can start before April 1, 2008; (2) any new federal regions should come as the result of popular grassroots initiatives in the existing governorates; and (3) there is no imperative for every governorate in Iraq to opt for a federal status (theoretically, the number of new federal regions may be anywhere from zero to 15).
Biden's plan either violates all three of these aspects of the Iraqi legal framework or it has no meaning it all."
****
The Biden amendment seems to assume that sectarian "cleansing" has accelerated the movement toward de-facto partition and he's simply acknowledging that development: "the amendment will not produce 'bloodshed and suffering' in Iraq. It is hard to imagine more bloodshed and suffering than we've already seen, which has been exacerbated by the failure of Iraq's leaders to stop sectarian violence and produce a durable, widely accepted political settlement. More than 4 million Iraqis have already fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate now of 100,000 every month. The whole purpose of my amendment is to end that bloodshed and suffering by promoting a power sharing arrangement that meets the interests of all Iraqis and gives them more local control over their daily lives."
But, apart from violating Iraq's constitution and ignoring its citizens in attempting to impose a political settlement from both above and outside, Biden's plan for Iraq would essentially legitimize militias and criminal enterprise. Roger Owen, Harvard professor of Middle East history, likens the situation to that "of Lebanon during its own civil war, there were enough economic resources scattered around the country for local warlords who controlled them to maintain their own loyal militias and civilian constituencies without having to reply on the leadership's financial support."
Or perhaps, as Gen. Petraeus said, of the situation in southern Iraq, "occasionally folks have said that this is -- I don't know -- a little like the Italian city-states in Machiavelli's day or something like that. But there's an awful lot of to-ing and fro-ing."
The forces arrayed against a unified Iraq are, of course, many: Kurdish autonomy, Shia militias, Sunni tribes, and any number of criminal enterprises, not to mention external state influences, all struggling for influence and power over others. Clearly, there is no one, simple solution that will tidy up and bring near-term resolution to a murky and multi-faceted problem.
As the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, put it, "Iraq is a federal state. The constitution says so. One of the challenges the Iraqis face right now is trying to work out what that actually means translated beyond the constitution into law and into practice. . . It's a work in progress."
Does Biden's proposal reflect his deep understanding of foreign affairs? Certainly, that is his claim as a candidate for the presidency. But his plan is driven by a desire, first and foremost, "to bring our troops home without leaving chaos behind." Yet it is unlikely, given the issues discussed above, that "federalizing" Iraq would provide stability. It more likely would intensify and exacerbate the power struggles already inflaming the country.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Bhutto Dead, Pakistan Dying
The assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto marks a dark day in an increasingly darker Pakistani future. Her death comes 12 days before national parliamentary elections in what the Washington Post described as an environment "already marked by enormous political turmoil."
A few days earlier, Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had accused the government of engineering terrorist acts to keep people from participating in the upcoming elections. "The government is manipulating all this in order to force people stay away from the election rallies. The ongoing wave of terrorist activities in the country is part of a conspiracy to terrorize people from attending political meetings."
Bhutto's death comes days after Pakistan's election commission rejected former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's appeal on his eligibility to stand for election. Of the lost appeal, a party spokesman for Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League party said, "This also shows that they are still afraid of his popularity and cannot face him . . . [and] that there is no level playing field in these elections."
As the BBC said of Bhutto's assassination and where it occurred, "Rawalpindi, a garrison city, is seen as one of the country's most secure cities, making the attack even more embarrassing for the military authorities."
But, then again, maybe not. That she was killed in Rawalpindi merely makes Musharraf seem to be the one likely responsible. Musharraf's actions, from his initial coup in 1999 to his manipulation of Pakistan's Supreme Court and the organs of governance since, have been designed (if clumsily) to retain power at any cost.
Now, Pakistan's future, already uncertain if not bleak, grows more so. The United States bears no small responsibility in this debacle. American funding of Pakistan's disordered tyranny, well beyond $10 billion thus far, has merely funded the Pakistani military which is Musharraf's key support structure in is bid to hold onto power.
So what now? While President Bush extended his "deepest condolences to the family of Benazir Bhutto, to her friends, to her supporters," those supporters need much more than condolences. They need, at the very least, the US to start linking any aid program with specific and concrete demands that Musharraf restore the civil institutions he has determinedly weakened. This includes the restoration of Pakistan's Supreme Court.
The 9/11 Commission in 2004 made the following recommendation regarding Pakistan:
If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own."
Of course, that didn't happen. The US made no fundamental, long-term commitment to strengthen the educational and institutional foundations of Pakistan. We merely looked away, useless rhetoric aside, and let Musharraf run roughshod over a nuclear-armed nation numbering 160 million.
We're witnessing merely the beginning of what our policy has wrought.
A few days earlier, Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had accused the government of engineering terrorist acts to keep people from participating in the upcoming elections. "The government is manipulating all this in order to force people stay away from the election rallies. The ongoing wave of terrorist activities in the country is part of a conspiracy to terrorize people from attending political meetings."
Bhutto's death comes days after Pakistan's election commission rejected former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's appeal on his eligibility to stand for election. Of the lost appeal, a party spokesman for Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League party said, "This also shows that they are still afraid of his popularity and cannot face him . . . [and] that there is no level playing field in these elections."
As the BBC said of Bhutto's assassination and where it occurred, "Rawalpindi, a garrison city, is seen as one of the country's most secure cities, making the attack even more embarrassing for the military authorities."
But, then again, maybe not. That she was killed in Rawalpindi merely makes Musharraf seem to be the one likely responsible. Musharraf's actions, from his initial coup in 1999 to his manipulation of Pakistan's Supreme Court and the organs of governance since, have been designed (if clumsily) to retain power at any cost.
Now, Pakistan's future, already uncertain if not bleak, grows more so. The United States bears no small responsibility in this debacle. American funding of Pakistan's disordered tyranny, well beyond $10 billion thus far, has merely funded the Pakistani military which is Musharraf's key support structure in is bid to hold onto power.
So what now? While President Bush extended his "deepest condolences to the family of Benazir Bhutto, to her friends, to her supporters," those supporters need much more than condolences. They need, at the very least, the US to start linking any aid program with specific and concrete demands that Musharraf restore the civil institutions he has determinedly weakened. This includes the restoration of Pakistan's Supreme Court.
The 9/11 Commission in 2004 made the following recommendation regarding Pakistan:
If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own."
Of course, that didn't happen. The US made no fundamental, long-term commitment to strengthen the educational and institutional foundations of Pakistan. We merely looked away, useless rhetoric aside, and let Musharraf run roughshod over a nuclear-armed nation numbering 160 million.
We're witnessing merely the beginning of what our policy has wrought.
Tuesday, December 25, 2007
Hoover's Ghost
A recently declassified letter from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House in 1950, following the onset of the Korean conflict, revealed his plans to imprison "approximately twelve thousand individuals, of which approximately ninety-seven per cent are citizens of the United States." They, Hoover claimed, were "individuals who are potentially dangerous to the internal security." Apart from the complete lack of reference to any evidence for this claim, and the remarkable contempt he displayed for Constitutional rights, there are several interesting features in the letter that demonstrate Hoover's police-state mentality.
Consider these nuggets:
--"It should be pointed out that the plan does not distinguish between aliens and citizens and both are included in its purview.";
--"The plan calls for a statement of charges to be served on each detainee and a hearing be afforded the individual within a specified period. The Hearing Board will consist of three members to be appointed by the Attorney General composed of one Judge of the United States or State Court and two citizens. The hearing procedure will give the detainee an opportunity to know why he is being detained and permit him to introduce material in the nature of evidence in his own behalf. The hearing procedure will not be bound by the rules of evidence."
Imagine. Judge, jury and executioner.
And it gets better. Not only does Hoover propose rounding up and imprisoning some 12,000 people but his plan essentially wrote legislation for Congress and an executive order for the president:
--"The plan contains a prepared document which should be referred to the President immediately upon the existence of one of the emergency situations for the President’s signature. Briefly, this proclamation recites the existence of the emergency situation and that in order to immediately protect the country against treason, espionage and sabotage the Attorney General is instructed to apprehend all individuals potentially dangerous to the internal security. In order to make effective these apprehensions, the proclamation suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus for apprehensions made pursuant to it.
The plan also contains a prepared joint resolution to be passed by Congress and an Executive Order for the President which too will validate the previous Presidential proclamation."
****
Of course, one might shrug and consign the letter to the dustbin of history. Then again, one might consider Hoover's undefined assumptions of what constitutes a threat in his plan to arrest thousands. A difference between now and 1950 is Congressional and judicial involvement. As Ronald Kessler, who's written about the FBI, argues "[t]he court has allowed . . . measures that the Bush administration has used to find terrorists to continue. Congress has allowed [them] to continue as well."
Yet recent legislative history doesn't shine so brightly, in light of the flaws in the Patriot Act, the Protect America Act, or pending Senate legislation on FISA and telecom immunity.
****
Now, consider House bill, HR 1955, the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007. Co-sponsored by Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) who chairs the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, the legislation calls for the establishment of a commission to "examine and report" on homegrown terrorism.
Sidling dangerously close to thought-police territory, the bill "finds", among other things, that "[t]he Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens."
Caroline Fredrickson of the ACLU, in objecting to the bill, notes that "[l]aw enforcement should focus on action, not thought. We need to worry about the people who are committing crimes rather than those who harbor beliefs that the government may consider to be extreme."
Rep. Harman responded in a letter to Fredrickson, writing "ideologically based violence is not a protected act – it is a crime. Our bill would establish a diverse, well-qualified, nonpartisan, short-term commission to make recommendations to Congress so it can better understand and hopefully take responsible steps to prevent ideologically based violence. This is not the 'thought police' and surely it is not censorship." (Apparently, there was sufficient anger over HR 1955 among constituents that Harman's committee felt compelled to publish a "fact sheet" to address concerns.)
****
Of course, Fredrickson didn't dispute that "ideologically-based violence is not a protected act." Why? Because violence (of the non-state sort) is not a protected act. But Harman's claim to have Congress "better understand" ideologically-based violence by focusing on the internet is confusing at best and threatening to speech at worst. What will be learned that we do not know already about "ideologically-based violence"? Violence advocacy websites abound on the internet. This is not an unknown. But thought can be combated only by thought. The only long-term goal of any Congressionally-authorized commission would be, inevitably, to limit speech. Those outside the US understand this.
Hoover may be dead now but with HR 1955 passed overwhelming by a vote of 404-6, it's clear his legacy haunts Washington D.C.
Consider these nuggets:
--"It should be pointed out that the plan does not distinguish between aliens and citizens and both are included in its purview.";
--"The plan calls for a statement of charges to be served on each detainee and a hearing be afforded the individual within a specified period. The Hearing Board will consist of three members to be appointed by the Attorney General composed of one Judge of the United States or State Court and two citizens. The hearing procedure will give the detainee an opportunity to know why he is being detained and permit him to introduce material in the nature of evidence in his own behalf. The hearing procedure will not be bound by the rules of evidence."
Imagine. Judge, jury and executioner.
And it gets better. Not only does Hoover propose rounding up and imprisoning some 12,000 people but his plan essentially wrote legislation for Congress and an executive order for the president:
--"The plan contains a prepared document which should be referred to the President immediately upon the existence of one of the emergency situations for the President’s signature. Briefly, this proclamation recites the existence of the emergency situation and that in order to immediately protect the country against treason, espionage and sabotage the Attorney General is instructed to apprehend all individuals potentially dangerous to the internal security. In order to make effective these apprehensions, the proclamation suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus for apprehensions made pursuant to it.
The plan also contains a prepared joint resolution to be passed by Congress and an Executive Order for the President which too will validate the previous Presidential proclamation."
****
Of course, one might shrug and consign the letter to the dustbin of history. Then again, one might consider Hoover's undefined assumptions of what constitutes a threat in his plan to arrest thousands. A difference between now and 1950 is Congressional and judicial involvement. As Ronald Kessler, who's written about the FBI, argues "[t]he court has allowed . . . measures that the Bush administration has used to find terrorists to continue. Congress has allowed [them] to continue as well."
Yet recent legislative history doesn't shine so brightly, in light of the flaws in the Patriot Act, the Protect America Act, or pending Senate legislation on FISA and telecom immunity.
****
Now, consider House bill, HR 1955, the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007. Co-sponsored by Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) who chairs the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, the legislation calls for the establishment of a commission to "examine and report" on homegrown terrorism.
Sidling dangerously close to thought-police territory, the bill "finds", among other things, that "[t]he Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens."
Caroline Fredrickson of the ACLU, in objecting to the bill, notes that "[l]aw enforcement should focus on action, not thought. We need to worry about the people who are committing crimes rather than those who harbor beliefs that the government may consider to be extreme."
Rep. Harman responded in a letter to Fredrickson, writing "ideologically based violence is not a protected act – it is a crime. Our bill would establish a diverse, well-qualified, nonpartisan, short-term commission to make recommendations to Congress so it can better understand and hopefully take responsible steps to prevent ideologically based violence. This is not the 'thought police' and surely it is not censorship." (Apparently, there was sufficient anger over HR 1955 among constituents that Harman's committee felt compelled to publish a "fact sheet" to address concerns.)
****
Of course, Fredrickson didn't dispute that "ideologically-based violence is not a protected act." Why? Because violence (of the non-state sort) is not a protected act. But Harman's claim to have Congress "better understand" ideologically-based violence by focusing on the internet is confusing at best and threatening to speech at worst. What will be learned that we do not know already about "ideologically-based violence"? Violence advocacy websites abound on the internet. This is not an unknown. But thought can be combated only by thought. The only long-term goal of any Congressionally-authorized commission would be, inevitably, to limit speech. Those outside the US understand this.
Hoover may be dead now but with HR 1955 passed overwhelming by a vote of 404-6, it's clear his legacy haunts Washington D.C.
Monday, December 24, 2007
The Pakistan Aid Abyss
From the not-surprising-in-the-least category comes a NY Times article on the lack of oversight of US aid to Pakistan. In a nice understatement, an anonymous "senior American military official" said, "I personally believe there is exaggeration and inflation. Then, I point back to the United States and say we didn’t have to give them money this way."
So how seriously can anyone take the statement of Assistant Secretary Of State For South And Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, who testified before the Senate on December 6 that "all of our assistance programs are directed toward helping Pakistan achieve" objectives including "its transition to an elected civilian-led democracy, to become a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights and the rule of law"?
One problem is what "directed" can possibly mean in the absence of oversight and accountability. Recent Congressional efforts to require accountability from Pakistan and the Bush Administration can't be seen as serious. As the Times puts it, "lawmakers in Washington voted Thursday to put restrictions on the $300 million in military financing, and withheld $50 million of that money until Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice certifies that Islamabad has been restoring democratic rights since Mr. Musharraf lifted a state of emergency on Dec. 16. The measure ha(s) little effect on the far larger Coalition Support Funds reimbursements."
No kidding. These "Coalition Support Funds" (CSF) are where the real money is. CSF is described by the Center for Public Integrity as "a program controlled by the Defense Department to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror." In May the center reported the results of an investigation by its International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). They found, among other things, that "Pakistan's increase in U.S. military aid in the three years after 9/11 is a stunning 50,000 percent, growing from just $9 million in the three years before the attacks to nearly $4.7 billion in the three years after."
According to Larry Korb of the Center for American Progress, since 2001 the US has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan, of which 60% has gone toward CSF and is "considered by the U.S. administration to be a repayment rather than assistance. However, since there has been little accountability or transparency of this funding, it is uncertain if in fact these funds are being used to fight the GWOT (Global War on Terror)."
The remainder goes to "security assistance" efforts (involving major weapons like F-16s) and efforts aimed at "macroeconomic stability and to free up funds for social spending [although] few transparent accountability mechanisms are built in."
And the remainder of US aid to Pakistan? K. Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service says "only about 10% of the more than $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs."
As Robert Hathaway of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars put it, "the administration has justified virtually all U.S. assistance to Pakistan in terms of counterterrorism. To the extent that the Pakistani security apparatus has been employed since November 3 in rounding up lawyers, opposition politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, it is difficult to argue that unconditional backing for Pakistan’s military supports the war against terrorism."
No wonder the administration doesn't seem unduly concerned about the relatively weak restrictions established by Congress last week in its $300 million funding for Pakistan. When you have vast amounts, numbering in the billions, of Coalition Support Funds tucked into defense spending, a little $300 million slice of aid lets Congress have its oversight public relations coup.
Meanwhile, the real coup in Pakistan is effectively met with indifference.
So how seriously can anyone take the statement of Assistant Secretary Of State For South And Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, who testified before the Senate on December 6 that "all of our assistance programs are directed toward helping Pakistan achieve" objectives including "its transition to an elected civilian-led democracy, to become a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights and the rule of law"?
One problem is what "directed" can possibly mean in the absence of oversight and accountability. Recent Congressional efforts to require accountability from Pakistan and the Bush Administration can't be seen as serious. As the Times puts it, "lawmakers in Washington voted Thursday to put restrictions on the $300 million in military financing, and withheld $50 million of that money until Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice certifies that Islamabad has been restoring democratic rights since Mr. Musharraf lifted a state of emergency on Dec. 16. The measure ha(s) little effect on the far larger Coalition Support Funds reimbursements."
No kidding. These "Coalition Support Funds" (CSF) are where the real money is. CSF is described by the Center for Public Integrity as "a program controlled by the Defense Department to reimburse key allies in the global war on terror." In May the center reported the results of an investigation by its International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). They found, among other things, that "Pakistan's increase in U.S. military aid in the three years after 9/11 is a stunning 50,000 percent, growing from just $9 million in the three years before the attacks to nearly $4.7 billion in the three years after."
According to Larry Korb of the Center for American Progress, since 2001 the US has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan, of which 60% has gone toward CSF and is "considered by the U.S. administration to be a repayment rather than assistance. However, since there has been little accountability or transparency of this funding, it is uncertain if in fact these funds are being used to fight the GWOT (Global War on Terror)."
The remainder goes to "security assistance" efforts (involving major weapons like F-16s) and efforts aimed at "macroeconomic stability and to free up funds for social spending [although] few transparent accountability mechanisms are built in."
And the remainder of US aid to Pakistan? K. Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service says "only about 10% of the more than $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs."
As Robert Hathaway of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars put it, "the administration has justified virtually all U.S. assistance to Pakistan in terms of counterterrorism. To the extent that the Pakistani security apparatus has been employed since November 3 in rounding up lawyers, opposition politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, it is difficult to argue that unconditional backing for Pakistan’s military supports the war against terrorism."
No wonder the administration doesn't seem unduly concerned about the relatively weak restrictions established by Congress last week in its $300 million funding for Pakistan. When you have vast amounts, numbering in the billions, of Coalition Support Funds tucked into defense spending, a little $300 million slice of aid lets Congress have its oversight public relations coup.
Meanwhile, the real coup in Pakistan is effectively met with indifference.
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Romney's "Anti-Endorsement"
When was the last time a candidate was explicitly rather than implicitly rejected by a newspaper's editorial board? The usual practice is to select a candidate for endorsement from the available list, but New Hampshire's Concord Monitor veered from that path to non-endorse Mitt Romney:
"if you followed only his tenure as governor of Massachusetts, you might imagine Romney as a pragmatic moderate with liberal positions on numerous social issues and an ability to work well with Democrats. If you followed only his campaign for president, you'd swear he was a red-meat conservative, pandering to the religious right, whatever the cost. Pay attention to both, and you're left to wonder if there's anything at all at his core."
His political makeover is certainly notable but far more so are his answers to questions on the limits of executive power posed by the Boston Globe's Charlie Savage. As Savage reminded readers, "in 2000, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney were not asked about presidential power, and they volunteered nothing about their attitude toward the issue to voters. Yet once in office, they immediately began seeking out ways to concentrate more unchecked power in the White House - not just for themselves, but also for their successors."
Here are Romney's responses to the first two of 12 questions on executive authority:
1. "Does the president have inherent powers under the Constitution to conduct surveillance for national security purposes without judicial warrants, regardless of federal statutes?"
Romney: "Intelligence and surveillance have proven to be some of the most effective national security tools we have to protect our nation. Our most basic civil liberty is the right to be kept alive and the President should not hesitate to use every legal tool at his disposal to keep America safe."
This "right to be kept alive" has become a useful cover to violate legal statues such as FISA. The "legal tool(s)" Romney refers to are related to Savage's fourth question on "signing statements" which President Bush has used to disregard Congressional statutes.
Walter Dellinger, former head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from 1993 to 1996, wrote of this issue that, "the Bush administration’s frequent and seemingly cavalier refusal to enforce laws, which is aggravated by its avoidance of judicial review and even public disclosure of its actions, places it at odds with these principles and with predecessors of both parties" (this complicated matter is discussed in detail here).
What about the so-called "Bush Doctrine of pre-emption," which permits attacks on other nations who might, at some point (but not imminently), pose a threat to the United States?
2. "In what circumstances, if any, would the president have constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from Congress? (Specifically, what about the strategic bombing of suspected nuclear sites -- a situation that does not involve stopping an IMMINENT threat?)"
Romney: "A President must always act in the best interests of the United States to protect us against a potential threat, including a nuclear Iran. Naturally, it is always preferable to seek agreement of all – leadership of our government as well as our friends around the world – where those circumstances are available."
Naturally, one ought to seek agreement of, among others, "leadership of our government" (read Congress) "where those circumstances are available." A better response, if he'd actually intended clarity in his answer, would have been to say that in the absence of imminent threat the president has no inherent war-making authority and must seek "a use-of-force authorization from Congress." Or, as Sen. Biden answered it, "our Founding Fathers vested in Congress, not the President, the power to initiate war, except to repel an imminent attack on the United States or its citizens."
Romney deserves credit for responding to the Globe's questions on executive authority (Huckabee, Giuliani and Thompson refused to participate). His answers though are, arguably, beyond the pale of how a president ought to conceive of the office. But when combined with his easy shifts on policy positions (whether on abortion or gay rights), he merits not only the rejection by the Concord Monitor but by any reasonable person.
"if you followed only his tenure as governor of Massachusetts, you might imagine Romney as a pragmatic moderate with liberal positions on numerous social issues and an ability to work well with Democrats. If you followed only his campaign for president, you'd swear he was a red-meat conservative, pandering to the religious right, whatever the cost. Pay attention to both, and you're left to wonder if there's anything at all at his core."
His political makeover is certainly notable but far more so are his answers to questions on the limits of executive power posed by the Boston Globe's Charlie Savage. As Savage reminded readers, "in 2000, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney were not asked about presidential power, and they volunteered nothing about their attitude toward the issue to voters. Yet once in office, they immediately began seeking out ways to concentrate more unchecked power in the White House - not just for themselves, but also for their successors."
Here are Romney's responses to the first two of 12 questions on executive authority:
1. "Does the president have inherent powers under the Constitution to conduct surveillance for national security purposes without judicial warrants, regardless of federal statutes?"
Romney: "Intelligence and surveillance have proven to be some of the most effective national security tools we have to protect our nation. Our most basic civil liberty is the right to be kept alive and the President should not hesitate to use every legal tool at his disposal to keep America safe."
This "right to be kept alive" has become a useful cover to violate legal statues such as FISA. The "legal tool(s)" Romney refers to are related to Savage's fourth question on "signing statements" which President Bush has used to disregard Congressional statutes.
Walter Dellinger, former head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from 1993 to 1996, wrote of this issue that, "the Bush administration’s frequent and seemingly cavalier refusal to enforce laws, which is aggravated by its avoidance of judicial review and even public disclosure of its actions, places it at odds with these principles and with predecessors of both parties" (this complicated matter is discussed in detail here).
What about the so-called "Bush Doctrine of pre-emption," which permits attacks on other nations who might, at some point (but not imminently), pose a threat to the United States?
2. "In what circumstances, if any, would the president have constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from Congress? (Specifically, what about the strategic bombing of suspected nuclear sites -- a situation that does not involve stopping an IMMINENT threat?)"
Romney: "A President must always act in the best interests of the United States to protect us against a potential threat, including a nuclear Iran. Naturally, it is always preferable to seek agreement of all – leadership of our government as well as our friends around the world – where those circumstances are available."
Naturally, one ought to seek agreement of, among others, "leadership of our government" (read Congress) "where those circumstances are available." A better response, if he'd actually intended clarity in his answer, would have been to say that in the absence of imminent threat the president has no inherent war-making authority and must seek "a use-of-force authorization from Congress." Or, as Sen. Biden answered it, "our Founding Fathers vested in Congress, not the President, the power to initiate war, except to repel an imminent attack on the United States or its citizens."
Romney deserves credit for responding to the Globe's questions on executive authority (Huckabee, Giuliani and Thompson refused to participate). His answers though are, arguably, beyond the pale of how a president ought to conceive of the office. But when combined with his easy shifts on policy positions (whether on abortion or gay rights), he merits not only the rejection by the Concord Monitor but by any reasonable person.
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