Since February 2007, when the US made public its desire to establish a central command for Africa, the project has been met in Africa with growing resistance and suspicion over what the US military really intends to do with such a command structure.
Would they build superbases chock full of military hardware and troops to protect access to oil supplies and other natural resources and, not incidentally, limit Chinese access to the same?
For many Africans, the project smacked of the first shot at re-colonizing the continent.
President Bush described AFRICOM as, "this new command [which] will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, explained AFRICOM as "a different command .... It would be a partnership, really, between military and civilians, and its principal focus would be to continue some of the activities that we're already doing to try and train peacekeeping forces so that countries in Africa and regional organizations in Africa can take more of a role in dealing with the conflicts and the problems on the continent .... I'm sure it will be an item of discussion on the trip, but I wouldn't be looking for any announcements at this point in time."
Few Africans have been persuaded by these seemingly benign descriptions. Since the US already has 1500 troops stationed in Djibouti, many wondered at the need for a second base.
In November, 2007, Robert G. Berschinski, a former intelligence officer in the US Air Force who served in Iraq, wrote a report titled AFRICOM’S DILEMMA: THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, "CAPACITY BUILDING," HUMANITARIANISM, AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN AFRICA, for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. In it, he says AFRICOM's "critics allege that the command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing the Africa’s burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.
To overcome such misgivings, AFRICOM must demonstrate a commitment to programs mutually beneficial to both African and American national interests. Yet a shrewd strategic communication campaign will not be enough to convince a skeptical African public that AFRICOM’s priorities mirror their own. Indeed, much African distrust is justified. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and East Africa, though couched in a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win 'hearts and minds,' have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on short-term objectives."
In the African blogosphere, suspicion and untrustworthiness dominate the discussion. As Sokari Ekine, who blogs at Black Looks sees it, "the question should not be whether Africa NEEDS Africom but why the US believes it NEEDS to have a military presence in Africa. We should be asking ourselves the following questions. Why does the US feels it needs a military presence in Africa? What will the US military presence consist of in terms of military hardware and numbers of personnel? How does the US intend to operate and in what circumstances will it’s forces be mobilized? In what way will the US military presence dictate or determine the price of Africa’s natural resources and who gets access to them? In what way will the US military presence infringe on the internal affairs of independent African countries and determine their foreign policy towards other AU members? How will the US military presence influence the foreign policy of independent African states towards non AU countries such as China? How will the US enhanced military presence infringe of the rights of African citizens? How will Africom impact on continental migration and the rights of the millions of Africans without citizenship and the rights of refugees?
Tristan at Contrary To Authority offered this assessment: "Africa is under a new wave of exploitation, this time, instead of people, rubber and gold, it is Chinese and American interests competing for oil."
Reasonable questions and assessments, made all the more so given global suspicions over the issue of permanent bases in Iraq.
When in Ghana, President Bush was told at a private meeting by Ghana's President John Kufuor, "you're not going to build any bases in Ghana," to which Bush responded, "I understand. Nor do we want to."
Bush added, "We do not contemplate adding new bases, in other words the purpose of this is not to add military bases. I know there are rumours in Ghana: 'All Bush is doing is coming to try to convince you to put a big military base here.' That's baloney."
But he then said: "That doesn't mean that we won't try to develop some kind of office in Africa. We haven't made our minds up. It's a new concept."
Definitely, suspicions will continue.
Saturday, February 23, 2008
Friday, February 22, 2008
Wandering, Wondering NATO
NATO's creaking, uneven Afghanistan effort promises to grow yet more wobbly with Canada threatening to leave the country by the end of 2011. The BBC reports that Canada's parliament will soon vote on the proposal to extend Canada's commitment (which was to expire in February, 2009) that also includes the date for withdrawal.
The Canadian government has been under pressure to declare a withdrawal date given the refusal of several NATO member states to send troops into combat areas (Germany, chief among them).
So, has Canada's domestic debate been one of the reasons for the Taliban's resurgence? Canada's Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, thinks so. He's argued that the Taliban have watched Canada's internal politics closely, and believes an extension beyond 2009 of a Canadian presence in Afghanistan is essential: "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link."
He cited, inferentially, a suicide attack this week that killed 80 people, one of Afghanistan's deadliest since the 2001 American invasion: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."
That the Taliban is aware of NATO's commitment problems isn't surprising (they have Internet access, too), but it's a bit hard to accept that the Taliban organizes its tactics around Canadian domestic debate.
It's probably sufficient to say that NATO's half-heartedness is obvious to the entire planet, the Taliban included.
Canada's in something of a tough spot since some of its European allies, primarily Germany, won't agree to send additional troops to the Kandahar region where Canadian troops are fighting.
The Manley Report, issued in January 2008, stated the obvious in proposing "a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself."
But that doesn't seem likely and, indeed, is really the essential point. Consider the recent comments by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said she was "worried" about some NATO ally comments regarding commitment, but that she had "absolutely no time" for suggestions/demands that Germany shift combat troops from the north to the south in Afghanistan: "We decided only a few years ago on a division of labour among Nato partners," that "continuity and stability" were the order of the day, and that "we're not just digging wells and building houses; we also have a military mission."
She emphasized that a critical obstacle--"one of the biggest weaknesses"--to Afghanistan reconstruction success lay in Kabul and the Karzai government: "Afghanistan must say more clearly what it wants."
Yet, according to Reuters, "Karzai has repeatedly urged Western allies to provide more funds and resources to the Afghan security forces, rather than send more troops."
Secretary of State Rice phrased it this way: "let's be very frank about it, there are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan. And ... [that entails] overlapping authorities and many different bureaucracies and many different groups, not to mention the very fine NGOs who work here and the UN, I can understand why sometimes there may be some confusion on priorities and what needs to get done when."
In a recent poll, 61% of Canadians did not think their government "ha[d] effectively explained the mission in Afghanistan."
According to the BBC, "ask most French people about the country's troop commitment in Afghanistan, and they will have little idea what you are talking about."
And in the UK, there is uncertainty over NATO's strategy. James Arbuthnot, House of Commons Defence Committee Chair, said "we don't want to see another 9/11. [And] 90% of the heroin on our streets comes from Afghanistan, [so our] political commitment is weakened by questions about whether we are actually doing the right things to solve those two problems."
Obviously, confusion and dissatisfaction dominate debate within NATO countries over Afghanistan, regarding all elements of the "mission."
The question is, does NATO really have a mission -- comprehensively and comprehensibly understood -- in Afghanistan?
The Canadian government has been under pressure to declare a withdrawal date given the refusal of several NATO member states to send troops into combat areas (Germany, chief among them).
So, has Canada's domestic debate been one of the reasons for the Taliban's resurgence? Canada's Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, thinks so. He's argued that the Taliban have watched Canada's internal politics closely, and believes an extension beyond 2009 of a Canadian presence in Afghanistan is essential: "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link."
He cited, inferentially, a suicide attack this week that killed 80 people, one of Afghanistan's deadliest since the 2001 American invasion: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."
That the Taliban is aware of NATO's commitment problems isn't surprising (they have Internet access, too), but it's a bit hard to accept that the Taliban organizes its tactics around Canadian domestic debate.
It's probably sufficient to say that NATO's half-heartedness is obvious to the entire planet, the Taliban included.
Canada's in something of a tough spot since some of its European allies, primarily Germany, won't agree to send additional troops to the Kandahar region where Canadian troops are fighting.
The Manley Report, issued in January 2008, stated the obvious in proposing "a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself."
But that doesn't seem likely and, indeed, is really the essential point. Consider the recent comments by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said she was "worried" about some NATO ally comments regarding commitment, but that she had "absolutely no time" for suggestions/demands that Germany shift combat troops from the north to the south in Afghanistan: "We decided only a few years ago on a division of labour among Nato partners," that "continuity and stability" were the order of the day, and that "we're not just digging wells and building houses; we also have a military mission."
She emphasized that a critical obstacle--"one of the biggest weaknesses"--to Afghanistan reconstruction success lay in Kabul and the Karzai government: "Afghanistan must say more clearly what it wants."
Yet, according to Reuters, "Karzai has repeatedly urged Western allies to provide more funds and resources to the Afghan security forces, rather than send more troops."
Secretary of State Rice phrased it this way: "let's be very frank about it, there are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan. And ... [that entails] overlapping authorities and many different bureaucracies and many different groups, not to mention the very fine NGOs who work here and the UN, I can understand why sometimes there may be some confusion on priorities and what needs to get done when."
In a recent poll, 61% of Canadians did not think their government "ha[d] effectively explained the mission in Afghanistan."
According to the BBC, "ask most French people about the country's troop commitment in Afghanistan, and they will have little idea what you are talking about."
And in the UK, there is uncertainty over NATO's strategy. James Arbuthnot, House of Commons Defence Committee Chair, said "we don't want to see another 9/11. [And] 90% of the heroin on our streets comes from Afghanistan, [so our] political commitment is weakened by questions about whether we are actually doing the right things to solve those two problems."
Obviously, confusion and dissatisfaction dominate debate within NATO countries over Afghanistan, regarding all elements of the "mission."
The question is, does NATO really have a mission -- comprehensively and comprehensibly understood -- in Afghanistan?
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Angela Merkel,
Canada,
Condoleezza Rice,
France,
Germany,
Hamid Karzai,
Kandahar,
Manley Report,
NATO,
United Kingdom
Thursday, February 21, 2008
McCain's Straight Talk Express Derails
In a speech last August at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, Barack Obama said, I understand that President Musharraf has his own challenges. But let me make this clear. There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again. It was a terrible mistake to fail to act when we had a chance to take out an al Qaeda leadership meeting in 2005. If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.
President Bush, confusing things as usual, said "I certainly don't know what [Obama] believes in. The only foreign policy thing I remember he said was he's going to attack Pakistan and embrace Ahmadinejad."
Then John McCain, taking the cue from his leader, criticized Obama for the statement, saying "Well, the best idea is to not broadcast what you're going to do. That's naive. You don't broadcast that you are going to bomb a country that is a sovereign nation and that you are dependent on ... in the struggle against (the) Taliban and the sanctuaries which they hold." He added that the US could not afford "confused leadership of an inexperienced candidate who once suggested bombing our ally Pakistan."
Ally? From World Public Opinion: "Pakistani views of the United States are quite negative. About two-thirds (64%) do not trust the United States 'to act responsibly in the world.' Very large majorities believe the US military presence in Afghanistan and in Asia is a critical threat to Pakistan's interests (68 percent and 72 percent respectively). Only 27 percent feel that the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on security and military matters has benefited Pakistan."
That is one weak definition of ally.
As for Pakistan being a sovereign nation, well, so is Iran. Of course, Obama in his speech did not threaten to invade or bomb Pakistan. Yet President Bush and McCain both felt free to put those words into his mouth. So would they object to anyone concluding that McCain intends to bomb or invade Iran? Here's what McCain said about Iran earlier this month at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC): I intend to make unmistakably clear to Iran we will not permit a government that espouses the destruction of the State of Israel as its fondest wish and pledges undying enmity to the United States to possess the weapons to advance their malevolent ambitions.
"Unmistakably clear ... we will not permit ...," sounds like invasion and/or bombing talk to me, if we employ the method of parsing that McCain used on Obama's speech and, of course, if we recall his "Bomb, bomb, Iran" "joke" sung to a Beach Boys tune.
And then there's this November 2007 example of McCain's "straight talk":
"Everybody says that they’re against the special interests. I’m the only one the special interests don’t give any money to." Even though he's received more than $500,000 from PACs, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
And when McCain challenged Obama on public funding for the general election campaign, saying "I made the commitment to the American people that if I were the nominee of my party, I would accept public financing, [and that] I expect Senator Obama to keep his word to the American people as well," he didn't mention that, in a letter to the Federal Election Commission dated February 6, 2008, he announced his intention to withdraw from the federal primary-election program, due--perhaps?--to an increase in private contributions now that he's the nominee-to-be.
I wonder, if it's good enough for the general election why not the primaries?
And, as the Guardian notes, that letter has drawn "unwelcome scrutiny from the agency that monitors US elections" since it "questions his ability to withdraw from the presidential public financing system – and avoid the spending limits that come with it."
As the Center for Responsive Politics concluded, "McCain's campaign has done a 180-degree turn in the last nine months, going from nearly broke after the 1st Quarter to recently emerging as the Republican frontrunner. It took early layoffs and a $3 million loan in November of 2007, but McCain managed to turn his campaign around and raise $41.1 million last year ...."
And what ever became of McCain's outright rejection of torture? He once said of waterboarding, "all I can say is that it was used in the Spanish Inquisition, it was used in Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia, and there are reports that it is being used against Buddhist monks today ... it is not a complicated procedure. It is torture." Yet he voted against recent Senate legislation banning the practice.
But let us not forget McCain's 2000 campaign speech in which he referred to the religious right's leaders as "agents of intolerance," denounced their strategy of "division and slander," and castigated them for their "corrupting influences on religion and politics." And now? In 2006 he said of the late founder of the Moral Majority, "Rev. Falwell came to see me and said he wanted to put our issues behind us — and I did, too. I believe the worst thing you can do in life, much less politics, is to hold grudges."
Grudges? Charges of intolerance, slander and corruption seem a good deal more serious than the mild lets-put-our-issues-behind us attitude.
Grover Norquist of the retrogressive/conservative Americans for Tax Reform, offered this assessment: "[McCain has] got to overcome the original sense of betrayal and the new sense of flip-flopping. This is not easy. You can't be the straight-talk express with two positions on every given issue."
Of course, one can shrug and say "politics," and that would be understandable. Except that it's John McCain who chose Straight Talk Express as his slogan, proudly displays it on his campaign bus, and has it on his website.
Truly, there's nothing like straight talk.
Except when it isn't.
President Bush, confusing things as usual, said "I certainly don't know what [Obama] believes in. The only foreign policy thing I remember he said was he's going to attack Pakistan and embrace Ahmadinejad."
Then John McCain, taking the cue from his leader, criticized Obama for the statement, saying "Well, the best idea is to not broadcast what you're going to do. That's naive. You don't broadcast that you are going to bomb a country that is a sovereign nation and that you are dependent on ... in the struggle against (the) Taliban and the sanctuaries which they hold." He added that the US could not afford "confused leadership of an inexperienced candidate who once suggested bombing our ally Pakistan."
Ally? From World Public Opinion: "Pakistani views of the United States are quite negative. About two-thirds (64%) do not trust the United States 'to act responsibly in the world.' Very large majorities believe the US military presence in Afghanistan and in Asia is a critical threat to Pakistan's interests (68 percent and 72 percent respectively). Only 27 percent feel that the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on security and military matters has benefited Pakistan."
That is one weak definition of ally.
As for Pakistan being a sovereign nation, well, so is Iran. Of course, Obama in his speech did not threaten to invade or bomb Pakistan. Yet President Bush and McCain both felt free to put those words into his mouth. So would they object to anyone concluding that McCain intends to bomb or invade Iran? Here's what McCain said about Iran earlier this month at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC): I intend to make unmistakably clear to Iran we will not permit a government that espouses the destruction of the State of Israel as its fondest wish and pledges undying enmity to the United States to possess the weapons to advance their malevolent ambitions.
"Unmistakably clear ... we will not permit ...," sounds like invasion and/or bombing talk to me, if we employ the method of parsing that McCain used on Obama's speech and, of course, if we recall his "Bomb, bomb, Iran" "joke" sung to a Beach Boys tune.
And then there's this November 2007 example of McCain's "straight talk":
"Everybody says that they’re against the special interests. I’m the only one the special interests don’t give any money to." Even though he's received more than $500,000 from PACs, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
And when McCain challenged Obama on public funding for the general election campaign, saying "I made the commitment to the American people that if I were the nominee of my party, I would accept public financing, [and that] I expect Senator Obama to keep his word to the American people as well," he didn't mention that, in a letter to the Federal Election Commission dated February 6, 2008, he announced his intention to withdraw from the federal primary-election program, due--perhaps?--to an increase in private contributions now that he's the nominee-to-be.
I wonder, if it's good enough for the general election why not the primaries?
And, as the Guardian notes, that letter has drawn "unwelcome scrutiny from the agency that monitors US elections" since it "questions his ability to withdraw from the presidential public financing system – and avoid the spending limits that come with it."
As the Center for Responsive Politics concluded, "McCain's campaign has done a 180-degree turn in the last nine months, going from nearly broke after the 1st Quarter to recently emerging as the Republican frontrunner. It took early layoffs and a $3 million loan in November of 2007, but McCain managed to turn his campaign around and raise $41.1 million last year ...."
And what ever became of McCain's outright rejection of torture? He once said of waterboarding, "all I can say is that it was used in the Spanish Inquisition, it was used in Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia, and there are reports that it is being used against Buddhist monks today ... it is not a complicated procedure. It is torture." Yet he voted against recent Senate legislation banning the practice.
But let us not forget McCain's 2000 campaign speech in which he referred to the religious right's leaders as "agents of intolerance," denounced their strategy of "division and slander," and castigated them for their "corrupting influences on religion and politics." And now? In 2006 he said of the late founder of the Moral Majority, "Rev. Falwell came to see me and said he wanted to put our issues behind us — and I did, too. I believe the worst thing you can do in life, much less politics, is to hold grudges."
Grudges? Charges of intolerance, slander and corruption seem a good deal more serious than the mild lets-put-our-issues-behind us attitude.
Grover Norquist of the retrogressive/conservative Americans for Tax Reform, offered this assessment: "[McCain has] got to overcome the original sense of betrayal and the new sense of flip-flopping. This is not easy. You can't be the straight-talk express with two positions on every given issue."
Of course, one can shrug and say "politics," and that would be understandable. Except that it's John McCain who chose Straight Talk Express as his slogan, proudly displays it on his campaign bus, and has it on his website.
Truly, there's nothing like straight talk.
Except when it isn't.
Labels:
Barack Obama,
George Bush,
Grover Norquist,
Jerry Falwell,
John McCain
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
Kosovo Independence & The Calculus of International Law
Kosovo's declaration of independence, recognized by the US and 17 (of 27) European Union member states, has widened the rift between those nations who supported it, those who did not and, perhaps more importantly, eroded the integrity of international territorial law. States rejecting Kosovo's declaration did so largely because they have minority populations seeking either independence or autonomy that might eventually lead to independence.
As the NY Times has it, even those nations who supported Kosovo's independence "took pains to point out that it should not serve as an invitation or precedent for other groups hoping to declare independence. That is because one of the biggest unknowns remains whether Kosovo’s declaration could rekindle conflicts elsewhere, including in ethnically divided Bosnia."
And not just Bosnia; China isn't enamored with the support for Kosovo given its hold on Tibet and its repeated claim to Taiwan. And Spain, another dissenter, has problems with its Basque population, as does Russia with Chechnya (among several others).
The European Union tried to square the circle by claiming "that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis [i.e., unique] case which does not call into question these principles and resolutions."
But, as the adage goes, does the exception prove the rule? Not according to those who oppose Kosovan independence. The Cypriot Foreign Minister, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, said "Cyprus, for reasons of principle, cannot recognise and will not recognise a unilateral declaration of independence. This is an issue of principle, of respect of international law, but also an issue of concern that it will create a precedent in international relations." She added, not too believably, that Cyprus' position had "nothing to do with the occupied Cyprus, it's not because we're afraid that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would declare independence because they already did it in 1983 and got a very strong reaction from the (UN) Security Council."
Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon would only offer "I am not here to say ‘legal’ or ‘illegal.'".
Serbia, for its part, dismissively rejected Kosovo independence. Serbian President Boris Tadic called it "unilateral and illegal ... null and void ... Serbia will never recognize the independence of Kosovo. We shall never renounce Kosovo and we shall not give up the struggle for our legitimate interests. For the citizens of Serbia and its institutions, Kosovo will forever remain a part of Serbia."
It will be particularly interesting to see what happens going forward. What impact will this have on the UN and on international law? Opinio Juris asks, for example, "does the Security Council have the power under the U.N. Charter to forcibly divide up its member states?"
Russia seems to be asking the question as well: "Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an international precedent, Russia should view existing territorial conflicts taking into account the Kosovo scenario."
Says the London Times, "Russia has threatened to recognise the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, a former Soviet republic now allied with the West, as retaliation for the 'dismemberment' of Serbian territory. The acceptance by the West of an independent Kosovo, the declaration stated, gave Russia precisely that right."
The European Union might plead sui generis, but Russia, one of many objectors, isn't buying it.
____________________
As the NY Times has it, even those nations who supported Kosovo's independence "took pains to point out that it should not serve as an invitation or precedent for other groups hoping to declare independence. That is because one of the biggest unknowns remains whether Kosovo’s declaration could rekindle conflicts elsewhere, including in ethnically divided Bosnia."
And not just Bosnia; China isn't enamored with the support for Kosovo given its hold on Tibet and its repeated claim to Taiwan. And Spain, another dissenter, has problems with its Basque population, as does Russia with Chechnya (among several others).
The European Union tried to square the circle by claiming "that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui generis [i.e., unique] case which does not call into question these principles and resolutions."
But, as the adage goes, does the exception prove the rule? Not according to those who oppose Kosovan independence. The Cypriot Foreign Minister, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, said "Cyprus, for reasons of principle, cannot recognise and will not recognise a unilateral declaration of independence. This is an issue of principle, of respect of international law, but also an issue of concern that it will create a precedent in international relations." She added, not too believably, that Cyprus' position had "nothing to do with the occupied Cyprus, it's not because we're afraid that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would declare independence because they already did it in 1983 and got a very strong reaction from the (UN) Security Council."
Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon would only offer "I am not here to say ‘legal’ or ‘illegal.'".
Serbia, for its part, dismissively rejected Kosovo independence. Serbian President Boris Tadic called it "unilateral and illegal ... null and void ... Serbia will never recognize the independence of Kosovo. We shall never renounce Kosovo and we shall not give up the struggle for our legitimate interests. For the citizens of Serbia and its institutions, Kosovo will forever remain a part of Serbia."
It will be particularly interesting to see what happens going forward. What impact will this have on the UN and on international law? Opinio Juris asks, for example, "does the Security Council have the power under the U.N. Charter to forcibly divide up its member states?"
Russia seems to be asking the question as well: "Now that the situation in Kosovo has become an international precedent, Russia should view existing territorial conflicts taking into account the Kosovo scenario."
Says the London Times, "Russia has threatened to recognise the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, a former Soviet republic now allied with the West, as retaliation for the 'dismemberment' of Serbian territory. The acceptance by the West of an independent Kosovo, the declaration stated, gave Russia precisely that right."
The European Union might plead sui generis, but Russia, one of many objectors, isn't buying it.
____________________
Monday, February 18, 2008
The Anti-Democratic Superdelegate
With the delegate count as close as it is between Senators Barack Obama (D-IL) and Hillary Clinton (D-NY), much of the attention has understandably switched to how the party's superdelegate structure works and who these people will support.
But that focus overlooks the more fundamental question--why do we have superdelegates at all?
It seems obvious that the very existence of such a mechanism is inherently undemocratic and certainly elitist. Here are a few examples of such elitism, from the AP: "'It raises the age old political question. Are we elected to monitor where our constituents are ... or are we to use our best judgment to do what's in the best interests of our constituents,' said Rep. Emanuel Cleaver of Missouri, a Clinton supporter even though Obama won his district."
Rep. Jim Clyburn of South Carolina believes the role of the superdelegate is similar to that of a member of Congress: "We ought to be doing the nation's business when we go to the floor of the House to vote," likening it to the superdelegate role at the party convention.
Nice, huh? One would be hardpressed to think of a better way to patronize one's constituents. Apparently, the children out there--also known as voters--need adult members of the party to decide what's in their best interests.
MoveOn.org has tried to bridge the divide with an online petition, which says:
Let the Voters Decide
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are still taking their case to the voters, and millions have yet to cast their ballots. Join 350,000 MoveOn members to tell the superdelegates to let the voters decide who our nominee is.
The rationale for the existence of superdelegates includes this sort of thing:
"The difference I see between the congressional representatives opinions and those of the public are:
1.) Congressional representatives have to operate right in the bowels of the political ecosystem everyday and may have better insight as to which candidate could fare in the ecosystem to achieve the party's goals. (There's a lot of unbelievable shenanigans that you don't see being reported outside of DC.)
2.) That's tempered by the money flows and other forms of influence going on in DC.
While you may not agree with the Superdelegate system -- which puts the delegates under no obligations to vote in one way or another -- those were the rules that were put in place by the Democratic party, and the fact is that voters chose their congressional representatives to make decisions on their behalf when they voted for them at the ballot box."
And the voter is to take on faith the "insight" of the representative who, because of familiarity with the "ecosystem," is more in the know than the typical voter? Well, sure, that representative is deeply knowledgeable about the workings of government, particularly as it relates to point #2--"the money flows and other forms of influence going on in D.C."
And yet, it ought to be noted, isn't point #2 a large chuck of the problem? Doesn't that make up an exceptionally large piece of voter discontent (lobbying/special interest influence)?
But worse is the final point, that "voters chose their congressional representatives to make decisions on their behalf when they voted for them at the ballot box."
Yes, that is so, as regards legislative decisions, but not regarding the party's presidential candidate. By that logic, why do we have primaries and caucuses at all? Why not simply defer to the wisdom of our elected representatives?
Sen. Clinton and her representatives have made clear where they stand on the issue (from the Washington Post):
--Clinton: "'Superdelegates are a part of the process. They are supposed to exercise independent judgment,' said Clinton ..., who wants to put into play hundreds of the unelected delegates, as well as large contingents from Michigan and Florida, where the candidates did not campaign."
--"Clinton strategist Harold Ickes, himself a superdelegate, told reporters Saturday that the delegates should exercise 'their best judgment in the interests of the party and the country,'" and said of a potential re-vote of the Michigan and Florida primaries not contested by Sen. Obama [due to the Democratic Party's decision to penalize those states for moving up their primary dates], 'we don't need a redo," said Ickes, who voted as a Democratic rules committee member to penalize the states. He said of Michigan: 'The people have spoken there.'"
Beautiful. Nothing like the (D)emocratic process at work in all its glory. Of course, one might argue that it's the business of the Democratic Party as to how it organizes itself and what constitutes it's rule structure. Then again, it is the Party that has chosen to cast itself as the voice of the people by stating, among other things, that "honest government" is part of its "vision."
As Princeton professor of history and public affairs, Julian Zelizer, observed: "It couldn't be more ironic; these are two people that party reforms were meant to bring into the Democratic Party. They might need the bosses to kind of decide which of the 'new Democrats' wins."
But Rep. Charlie Rangel (D-NY) sees the situation clearly enough: "It's the people [who are] going to govern who selects our next candidate and not superdelegates. The people's will is what's going to prevail at the convention and not people who decide what the people's will is."
The best way to ensure that is to have the superdelegates stand down and let the voters decide. How's that for a revolutionary and democratic idea?
But that focus overlooks the more fundamental question--why do we have superdelegates at all?
It seems obvious that the very existence of such a mechanism is inherently undemocratic and certainly elitist. Here are a few examples of such elitism, from the AP: "'It raises the age old political question. Are we elected to monitor where our constituents are ... or are we to use our best judgment to do what's in the best interests of our constituents,' said Rep. Emanuel Cleaver of Missouri, a Clinton supporter even though Obama won his district."
Rep. Jim Clyburn of South Carolina believes the role of the superdelegate is similar to that of a member of Congress: "We ought to be doing the nation's business when we go to the floor of the House to vote," likening it to the superdelegate role at the party convention.
Nice, huh? One would be hardpressed to think of a better way to patronize one's constituents. Apparently, the children out there--also known as voters--need adult members of the party to decide what's in their best interests.
MoveOn.org has tried to bridge the divide with an online petition, which says:
Let the Voters Decide
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are still taking their case to the voters, and millions have yet to cast their ballots. Join 350,000 MoveOn members to tell the superdelegates to let the voters decide who our nominee is.
The rationale for the existence of superdelegates includes this sort of thing:
"The difference I see between the congressional representatives opinions and those of the public are:
1.) Congressional representatives have to operate right in the bowels of the political ecosystem everyday and may have better insight as to which candidate could fare in the ecosystem to achieve the party's goals. (There's a lot of unbelievable shenanigans that you don't see being reported outside of DC.)
2.) That's tempered by the money flows and other forms of influence going on in DC.
While you may not agree with the Superdelegate system -- which puts the delegates under no obligations to vote in one way or another -- those were the rules that were put in place by the Democratic party, and the fact is that voters chose their congressional representatives to make decisions on their behalf when they voted for them at the ballot box."
And the voter is to take on faith the "insight" of the representative who, because of familiarity with the "ecosystem," is more in the know than the typical voter? Well, sure, that representative is deeply knowledgeable about the workings of government, particularly as it relates to point #2--"the money flows and other forms of influence going on in D.C."
And yet, it ought to be noted, isn't point #2 a large chuck of the problem? Doesn't that make up an exceptionally large piece of voter discontent (lobbying/special interest influence)?
But worse is the final point, that "voters chose their congressional representatives to make decisions on their behalf when they voted for them at the ballot box."
Yes, that is so, as regards legislative decisions, but not regarding the party's presidential candidate. By that logic, why do we have primaries and caucuses at all? Why not simply defer to the wisdom of our elected representatives?
Sen. Clinton and her representatives have made clear where they stand on the issue (from the Washington Post):
--Clinton: "'Superdelegates are a part of the process. They are supposed to exercise independent judgment,' said Clinton ..., who wants to put into play hundreds of the unelected delegates, as well as large contingents from Michigan and Florida, where the candidates did not campaign."
--"Clinton strategist Harold Ickes, himself a superdelegate, told reporters Saturday that the delegates should exercise 'their best judgment in the interests of the party and the country,'" and said of a potential re-vote of the Michigan and Florida primaries not contested by Sen. Obama [due to the Democratic Party's decision to penalize those states for moving up their primary dates], 'we don't need a redo," said Ickes, who voted as a Democratic rules committee member to penalize the states. He said of Michigan: 'The people have spoken there.'"
Beautiful. Nothing like the (D)emocratic process at work in all its glory. Of course, one might argue that it's the business of the Democratic Party as to how it organizes itself and what constitutes it's rule structure. Then again, it is the Party that has chosen to cast itself as the voice of the people by stating, among other things, that "honest government" is part of its "vision."
As Princeton professor of history and public affairs, Julian Zelizer, observed: "It couldn't be more ironic; these are two people that party reforms were meant to bring into the Democratic Party. They might need the bosses to kind of decide which of the 'new Democrats' wins."
But Rep. Charlie Rangel (D-NY) sees the situation clearly enough: "It's the people [who are] going to govern who selects our next candidate and not superdelegates. The people's will is what's going to prevail at the convention and not people who decide what the people's will is."
The best way to ensure that is to have the superdelegates stand down and let the voters decide. How's that for a revolutionary and democratic idea?
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