Wandering, Wondering NATO

NATO's creaking, uneven Afghanistan effort promises to grow yet more wobbly with Canada threatening to leave the country by the end of 2011. The BBC reports that Canada's parliament will soon vote on the proposal to extend Canada's commitment (which was to expire in February, 2009) that also includes the date for withdrawal.
The Canadian government has been under pressure to declare a withdrawal date given the refusal of several NATO member states to send troops into combat areas (Germany, chief among them).
So, has Canada's domestic debate been one of the reasons for the Taliban's resurgence? Canada's Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, thinks so. He's argued that the Taliban have watched Canada's internal politics closely, and believes an extension beyond 2009 of a Canadian presence in Afghanistan is essential: "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link."
He cited, inferentially, a suicide attack this week that killed 80 people, one of Afghanistan's deadliest since the 2001 American invasion: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."
That the Taliban is aware of NATO's commitment problems isn't surprising (they have Internet access, too), but it's a bit hard to accept that the Taliban organizes its tactics around Canadian domestic debate.
It's probably sufficient to say that NATO's half-heartedness is obvious to the entire planet, the Taliban included.

Canada's in something of a tough spot since some of its European allies, primarily Germany, won't agree to send additional troops to the Kandahar region where Canadian troops are fighting.
The Manley Report, issued in January 2008, stated the obvious in proposing "a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself."
But that doesn't seem likely and, indeed, is really the essential point. Consider the recent comments by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said she was "worried" about some NATO ally comments regarding commitment, but that she had "absolutely no time" for suggestions/demands that Germany shift combat troops from the north to the south in Afghanistan: "We decided only a few years ago on a division of labour among Nato partners," that "continuity and stability" were the order of the day, and that "we're not just digging wells and building houses; we also have a military mission."
She emphasized that a critical obstacle--"one of the biggest weaknesses"--to Afghanistan reconstruction success lay in Kabul and the Karzai government: "Afghanistan must say more clearly what it wants."

Yet, according to Reuters, "Karzai has repeatedly urged Western allies to provide more funds and resources to the Afghan security forces, rather than send more troops."
Secretary of State Rice phrased it this way: "let's be very frank about it, there are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan. And ... [that entails] overlapping authorities and many different bureaucracies and many different groups, not to mention the very fine NGOs who work here and the UN, I can understand why sometimes there may be some confusion on priorities and what needs to get done when."

In a recent poll, 61% of Canadians did not think their government "ha[d] effectively explained the mission in Afghanistan."
According to the BBC, "ask most French people about the country's troop commitment in Afghanistan, and they will have little idea what you are talking about."
And in the UK, there is uncertainty over NATO's strategy. James Arbuthnot, House of Commons Defence Committee Chair, said "we don't want to see another 9/11. [And] 90% of the heroin on our streets comes from Afghanistan, [so our] political commitment is weakened by questions about whether we are actually doing the right things to solve those two problems."

Obviously, confusion and dissatisfaction dominate debate within NATO countries over Afghanistan, regarding all elements of the "mission."
The question is, does NATO really have a mission -- comprehensively and comprehensibly understood -- in Afghanistan?