The absence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda--and, apparently, the critical media response to that absence--has prompted the Pentagon to squelch a report on the matter.
Produced by the the Institute for Defense Analyses and titled "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents," only the executive summary (redacted, natch) has been made available.
The summary document includes quotes such as this one from Saddam: " ... when they say anything about Iraq--[like] Iraq supports terrorism--then they have to say that Iraq has documents on this issue and [we] don't ..."
Says the study, although the "Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) review of captured Iraqi documents uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism ... [of a] disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements ... this study found no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al-Qaeda."
Further, the study noted, "the predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq."
Of course, the report runs counter to repeated claims by the Bush Administration that Saddam worked with al-Qaeda.
George Bush in September 2002: "al Qaeda hides, Saddam doesn't, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world. Both of them need to be dealt with. The war on terror, you can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror."
And to think--what a surprise--that a taxpayer-funded report contradicting administration "intelligence" on the matter hasn't been released to the public (technically, it is available "only to those who ask for it, and it will be sent via U.S. mail from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia," according to ABCNews, but it won't be posted online as originally intended.).
Several conservative outlets, such as the Weekly Standard, have in the past repeated the assertion of a linkage between Saddam and al-Qaeda. In 2005, Stephen F. Hayes and Thomas Joscelyn wrote, "the evidence we present below, compiled from revelations in recent months, suggests an acute case of denial on the part of those who dismiss the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship."
What follows is a list of what I imagine an attorney would term, at best, circumstantial evidence--for example:
"1. from 1987 to 1989, the detainee served as an infantryman in the Iraqi Army and received training on the mortar and rocket propelled grenades.
2. A Taliban recruiter in Baghdad convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban in 1994.
3. The detainee admitted he was a member of the Taliban.
4. The detainee pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the Taliban to help them take over all of Afghanistan," among others.
My goodness. That surely proves a connection between--what?--a single Iraqi and the Taliban? It's obvious to all of us that, therefore, Osama bin-Laden plotted with Saddam Hussein to bring down the WTC, defeat the US and establish a global Caliphate ruled jointly by Hussein and bin-Laden.
Ah, but there's that pesky 9/11 Report which has this:
"Responding to a presidential tasking, [counter-terrorism chief Richard] Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled 'Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.' Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda.The memo found no 'compelling case' that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks ... arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons."
(emphasis added)
And let us might remind ourselves of the Senate Intelligence Committee's Report which found, "the data reveal few indications of an established relationship between al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein's regime before September 11, 2001."
Nevertheless, as George Bush said in 2004, "the reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and Al-Qaeda is because there was a relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda."
Behold that Bushism: It's the truth because it's the truth.
Even though it isn't.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
An Admiral "Resigns" and More War Threatens
It's a bad sign, to put it mildly, that Admiral William Fallon, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East (CENTCOM), has "resigned" due to his opposition to the Washington nomenklatura's lip-licking, salivating insistence on attacking Iran.
Depressingly, this increases the possibility/probability of an expansion and acceleration of this seemingly eternal War on Terror.
It would be an understandable, were this administration possessed with some equanimity, to argue that Fallon's departure is the result of an unacceptable divergence from policy by a subordinate. After all, this is a republic where the military must defer to the civilian leadership.
And as a matter of principle, few would disagree.
But--and this is certainly obvious nearly eight years into a disastrous "governance"--George Bush and Co. remain as arrogant, belligerent and threatening as ever. And all signs point to more of the same following Fallon's departure. In any case, there was no "official" disagreement between Fallon and the White House to begin with, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
Speaking with utter believability, Gates said of Fallon's resignation/retirement, "I believe it was the right thing to do, even though I do not believe there are, in fact, significant differences between his views and administration policy ... [although] I think there is this misperception out there that there were."
Then again, when Fallon was interviewed by al-Jazeera last September, he said of Iran, as reported by the Financial Times, "this constant drum beat of conflict is what strikes me, which is not helpful and not useful. I expect that there will be no war and that is what we ought to be working for."
Prior to that, he apparently ruffled feathers in Washington by improving military relations with China which resulted in, as Esquire put it, "the Pentagon and Congress ... realizing that their favorite 'programs of record' (i.e., weapons systems and major vehicle platforms) were threatened by such talks that the shit hit the fan."
Said Fallon, "I blew my stack. I told [then-Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld, Just look at this shit. I go up to the Hill and I get three or four guys grabbing me and jerking me out of the aisle, all because somebody came up and told them that the sky was going to cave in."
Sec. Gates said that Fallon "told me that, quote, 'The current embarrassing situation, public perception of differences between my views and administration policy, and the distraction this causes from the mission make this the rigbt [sic] thing to do,' unquote."
Gates insisted, throughout the course of his public statement on the matter, that Fallon "was fully supportive of" administration policy regarding Iran, that there was a public "misperception" about it, but that there were no "differences at all" between the admiral and the White House.
Yet, as Esquire put it, "well-placed observers now say that it will come as no surprise if Fallon is relieved of his command before his time is up next spring, maybe as early as this summer, in favor of a commander the White House considers to be more pliable. If that were to happen, it may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year and don't want a commander standing in their way."
When a reporter at Gates' press conference, referring to the Esquire article, said "there was a line in that ... story that said that basically if Fallon gets fired, it means we're going to war with Iran. Can you just address that --"
Gates said, "well, it's just ridiculous. It's ridiculous ... the notion that this decision portends anything in terms of a change in Iran policy is, to quote myself, ridiculous."
Huh.
Okay, then.
I guess that's settled.
Depressingly, this increases the possibility/probability of an expansion and acceleration of this seemingly eternal War on Terror.
It would be an understandable, were this administration possessed with some equanimity, to argue that Fallon's departure is the result of an unacceptable divergence from policy by a subordinate. After all, this is a republic where the military must defer to the civilian leadership.
And as a matter of principle, few would disagree.
But--and this is certainly obvious nearly eight years into a disastrous "governance"--George Bush and Co. remain as arrogant, belligerent and threatening as ever. And all signs point to more of the same following Fallon's departure. In any case, there was no "official" disagreement between Fallon and the White House to begin with, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
Speaking with utter believability, Gates said of Fallon's resignation/retirement, "I believe it was the right thing to do, even though I do not believe there are, in fact, significant differences between his views and administration policy ... [although] I think there is this misperception out there that there were."
Then again, when Fallon was interviewed by al-Jazeera last September, he said of Iran, as reported by the Financial Times, "this constant drum beat of conflict is what strikes me, which is not helpful and not useful. I expect that there will be no war and that is what we ought to be working for."
Prior to that, he apparently ruffled feathers in Washington by improving military relations with China which resulted in, as Esquire put it, "the Pentagon and Congress ... realizing that their favorite 'programs of record' (i.e., weapons systems and major vehicle platforms) were threatened by such talks that the shit hit the fan."
Said Fallon, "I blew my stack. I told [then-Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld, Just look at this shit. I go up to the Hill and I get three or four guys grabbing me and jerking me out of the aisle, all because somebody came up and told them that the sky was going to cave in."
Sec. Gates said that Fallon "told me that, quote, 'The current embarrassing situation, public perception of differences between my views and administration policy, and the distraction this causes from the mission make this the rigbt [sic] thing to do,' unquote."
Gates insisted, throughout the course of his public statement on the matter, that Fallon "was fully supportive of" administration policy regarding Iran, that there was a public "misperception" about it, but that there were no "differences at all" between the admiral and the White House.
Yet, as Esquire put it, "well-placed observers now say that it will come as no surprise if Fallon is relieved of his command before his time is up next spring, maybe as early as this summer, in favor of a commander the White House considers to be more pliable. If that were to happen, it may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year and don't want a commander standing in their way."
When a reporter at Gates' press conference, referring to the Esquire article, said "there was a line in that ... story that said that basically if Fallon gets fired, it means we're going to war with Iran. Can you just address that --"
Gates said, "well, it's just ridiculous. It's ridiculous ... the notion that this decision portends anything in terms of a change in Iran policy is, to quote myself, ridiculous."
Huh.
Okay, then.
I guess that's settled.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Hollywood, the Wars and an Untrusting Audience
Where does the American public stand, really, on the Iraq War specifically and the War on Terror generally?
Many people have, since these wars began, protested vociferously, loudly and repeatedly for them to end (indeed, in the case of Iraq, for it not to begin).
And yet they go on.
Is it because we've, collectively, failed to persuade elected representatives of our rejection of them? Is it that those representatives feel safe to disregard that rejection out of the belief that only fringe elements feel so strongly? In short, is it that, at bottom, there simply aren't enough people who stand against perpetual war compared with those who reflexively support the Bush Administration?
According to recent polling data from Rasmussen Reports, "46% of likely voters believe the U.S. and its allies are winning the War on Terror," while a combined 49% say either "the terrorists" are winning or neither is the case.
"Short-term optimism about the War in Iraq is greater than long-term optimism" where "45% say it will ultimately be judged a failure".
Gallup, meanwhile, polled Americans in late January/early February and found "that a majority of Americans continue to express opposition to the war in Iraq, attitudes that are unchanged in the last two months ... 57% of Americans say it was a mistake for the United States to send troops to Iraq, while 41% say it was not a mistake. Those numbers are identical to what Gallup measured in late November/early December.
This broad measure of the correctness of the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq has not changed much, even with more positive assessments of U.S. progress in Iraq in the last three months."
It seems safe to say that most Americans aren't generally happy with their government's war-related policies.
Yet Hollywood's attempts to to address the issue through such films as Redacted, Rendition, In the Valley of Elah, Grace is Gone, Lions for Lambs, and A Mighty Heart (which, I suppose, doesn't count since it's a non-American film) have been met with a box office thud. Surely they weren't all poor films (although Time's Richard Corliss says, fairly or not, "the great Iraq movie--like a solution to the current Iraq quandary--is still a thing to hope for").
Rendition brought in less than $10 million. The Valley of Elah under $7 million. Redacted slightly more than $65 thousand. Lions for Lambs a little more than $15 million. And A Mighty Heart with Angelina Jolie generated a mere $9 million.
How did they do on dvd? According to Rotten Tomatoes, Rendition has brought in $5 million thus far. In The Valley of Elah some $4.5+ million.
What, then, does this reveal about public attitudes and Hollywood's efforts?
NY Times critic A.O. Scott, in a November 2007 review of Brian De Palma's Redacted, wrote that "Mr. De Palma’s premise, implicit in his choice of title and stated in many interviews and public pronouncements, is that the truth about Iraq has been edited and obscured, kept away from the American public," but that "I think he may have misdiagnosed the condition of the audience, which is not lack of information about Iraq but rather a pervasive moral and political paralysis."
But "pervasive moral and political paralysis" is a better description of American politicians than its citizens.
Many have tried to explain why it's taken so long to make such movies and/or why audiences aren't responding.
Michael Cieply of the NY Times noted that "in the past, Hollywood usually gave the veteran more breathing space. William Wyler’s 'Best Years of Our Lives,' about the travails of those returning from World War II, was released more than a year after the war’s end. Similarly Hal Ashby’s 'Coming Home' and Oliver Stone’s 'Born on the Fourth of July, both stories of Vietnam veterans, came well after the fall of Saigon."
But today, according to Scott Rudin who's a producer of the upcoming Stop-Loss, "media in general responds much more quickly than ever before. Why shouldn’t movies do the same?"
To John Patterson of the Guardian, this has been anything but a quick response: "The Hollywood studios have taken their own sweet time facing up to the Iraq war. The conflict has dragged on for four and a half years, longer than America's involvement in the second world war, yet only now is Hollywood beginning to address it head on. And even though documentarists have been tearing into the subject almost from the beginning ... Iraq seems to have utterly paralysed Hollywood's ability to address war with its usual vigour and bloodthirsty enthusiasm."
Lew Harris of Movies.com said, in an AFP article, that "these movies have to be entertaining. You can't just take a movie and make it anti-war or anti-torture and expect to draw people in. That's what happened with 'Rendition' and it has been a disaster. People want war movies to have a slam-bang adventure feel to them ... But Iraq is a difficult war to portray in a kind of rah-rah-rah, exciting way."
Equally bizarre was the view of John Cooper of the Sundance Film Festival that audiences are "ready for funny. Film-makers haven't said all there is to say about the war in Iraq, but I think audiences are saturated."
I suspect audiences are less saturated than wary and are simply not inclined to trust Hollywood or other media when it comes to coverage--dramatic or otherwise--of these wars.
Why should they? The mainstream media, inclusive of Hollywood, is part of the elite and the seller of bills of goods.
When Harris Interactive found that "over half of Americans say they tend not to trust the press," they were of course referring to cable and network news, print media and radio. Had they included Hollywood, those numbers might have been worse.
Many people have, since these wars began, protested vociferously, loudly and repeatedly for them to end (indeed, in the case of Iraq, for it not to begin).
And yet they go on.
Is it because we've, collectively, failed to persuade elected representatives of our rejection of them? Is it that those representatives feel safe to disregard that rejection out of the belief that only fringe elements feel so strongly? In short, is it that, at bottom, there simply aren't enough people who stand against perpetual war compared with those who reflexively support the Bush Administration?
According to recent polling data from Rasmussen Reports, "46% of likely voters believe the U.S. and its allies are winning the War on Terror," while a combined 49% say either "the terrorists" are winning or neither is the case.
"Short-term optimism about the War in Iraq is greater than long-term optimism" where "45% say it will ultimately be judged a failure".
Gallup, meanwhile, polled Americans in late January/early February and found "that a majority of Americans continue to express opposition to the war in Iraq, attitudes that are unchanged in the last two months ... 57% of Americans say it was a mistake for the United States to send troops to Iraq, while 41% say it was not a mistake. Those numbers are identical to what Gallup measured in late November/early December.
This broad measure of the correctness of the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq has not changed much, even with more positive assessments of U.S. progress in Iraq in the last three months."
It seems safe to say that most Americans aren't generally happy with their government's war-related policies.
Yet Hollywood's attempts to to address the issue through such films as Redacted, Rendition, In the Valley of Elah, Grace is Gone, Lions for Lambs, and A Mighty Heart (which, I suppose, doesn't count since it's a non-American film) have been met with a box office thud. Surely they weren't all poor films (although Time's Richard Corliss says, fairly or not, "the great Iraq movie--like a solution to the current Iraq quandary--is still a thing to hope for").
Rendition brought in less than $10 million. The Valley of Elah under $7 million. Redacted slightly more than $65 thousand. Lions for Lambs a little more than $15 million. And A Mighty Heart with Angelina Jolie generated a mere $9 million.
How did they do on dvd? According to Rotten Tomatoes, Rendition has brought in $5 million thus far. In The Valley of Elah some $4.5+ million.
What, then, does this reveal about public attitudes and Hollywood's efforts?
NY Times critic A.O. Scott, in a November 2007 review of Brian De Palma's Redacted, wrote that "Mr. De Palma’s premise, implicit in his choice of title and stated in many interviews and public pronouncements, is that the truth about Iraq has been edited and obscured, kept away from the American public," but that "I think he may have misdiagnosed the condition of the audience, which is not lack of information about Iraq but rather a pervasive moral and political paralysis."
But "pervasive moral and political paralysis" is a better description of American politicians than its citizens.
Many have tried to explain why it's taken so long to make such movies and/or why audiences aren't responding.
Michael Cieply of the NY Times noted that "in the past, Hollywood usually gave the veteran more breathing space. William Wyler’s 'Best Years of Our Lives,' about the travails of those returning from World War II, was released more than a year after the war’s end. Similarly Hal Ashby’s 'Coming Home' and Oliver Stone’s 'Born on the Fourth of July, both stories of Vietnam veterans, came well after the fall of Saigon."
But today, according to Scott Rudin who's a producer of the upcoming Stop-Loss, "media in general responds much more quickly than ever before. Why shouldn’t movies do the same?"
To John Patterson of the Guardian, this has been anything but a quick response: "The Hollywood studios have taken their own sweet time facing up to the Iraq war. The conflict has dragged on for four and a half years, longer than America's involvement in the second world war, yet only now is Hollywood beginning to address it head on. And even though documentarists have been tearing into the subject almost from the beginning ... Iraq seems to have utterly paralysed Hollywood's ability to address war with its usual vigour and bloodthirsty enthusiasm."
Lew Harris of Movies.com said, in an AFP article, that "these movies have to be entertaining. You can't just take a movie and make it anti-war or anti-torture and expect to draw people in. That's what happened with 'Rendition' and it has been a disaster. People want war movies to have a slam-bang adventure feel to them ... But Iraq is a difficult war to portray in a kind of rah-rah-rah, exciting way."
Equally bizarre was the view of John Cooper of the Sundance Film Festival that audiences are "ready for funny. Film-makers haven't said all there is to say about the war in Iraq, but I think audiences are saturated."
I suspect audiences are less saturated than wary and are simply not inclined to trust Hollywood or other media when it comes to coverage--dramatic or otherwise--of these wars.
Why should they? The mainstream media, inclusive of Hollywood, is part of the elite and the seller of bills of goods.
When Harris Interactive found that "over half of Americans say they tend not to trust the press," they were of course referring to cable and network news, print media and radio. Had they included Hollywood, those numbers might have been worse.
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Republican Free Traders--But Only Kinda
The Air Force's $35 billion re-fueling tanker contract decision has generated simultaneously amusing, pathetic, bizarre and, without-the-grace-to-blush hypocritical sputterings from our political elite. The decision to award the contract to a team led by Northrop-Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) has caused much tooth gnashing.
Witness, for example, the statement of senators Pat Roberts, Sam Brownback and Rep. Todd Tiahrt, Republicans all, as reported by the Seattle Post Intelligencer: "We have just met with the Air Force, and we remain unconvinced that the Airbus team will provide a better aircraft than the men and women of Boeing."
Thus opined these aerospace experts.
But oh, those Europeans! Roberts noted that much of the work will be done in France and Germany! Why, he blustered, thereby underscoring the soundbite idiocy of his party, the Pentagon's decision "supports a socialist kind of government."
This from members of a party committed to free trade, open markets and competition? Yes, it's so.
But it's not just Republicans. Here's a letter to Defense Secretary Gates from Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA): "A bipartisan delegation of Senators from Washington state and Kansas today called on Defense Secretary Robert Gates to ensure that the Air Force debriefs Boeing on the justification for their tanker contract decision this week."
It's remarkable, really, the coincidental aspect of the bipartisan nature of this missive, that members are from Washington state and Kansas. Why, could it be that both states have Boeing facilities?
Lost in the apoplectic reaction was the news, as reported by the International Herald Tribune, that "final assembly of the tankers would take place at a new plant that EADS plans to build near Mobile, Alabama. As a sweetener to its bid, EADS offered in January to build a second assembly line to produce a cargo version of the A330 for commercial use, raising the number of expected new jobs at the Alabama site to 1,300. Northrop and EADS have said the tanker program will eventually create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the United States through supplier contracts."
But the Republican Party's presidential candidate, that maverick John McCain, is--thankfully--a supporter of free trade. And if his defense of NAFTA in response to statements by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton isn't persuasive enough on philosophical grounds, why, there's always the not-so-veiled threat of payback/extortion/blackmail, call it what you will.
Said McCain, "one of our greatest assets in Afghanistan are our Canadian friends. We need our Canadian friends, and we need their continued support in Afghanistan. So what do we do? The two Democratic candidates for president say they're going to unilaterally abrogate NAFTA .... How do you think the Canadian people are going to react to that?"
Too bad McCain doesn't consult with Sen. Roberts. "Our Canadian friends," after all, have a "socialist kind of government" with universal health care.
But in defense of Republicans, we might call to mind Emerson's observation that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." Although Batleby.com reminds us that "Emerson does not explain the difference between foolish and wise consistency."
Or hypocrisy.
Witness, for example, the statement of senators Pat Roberts, Sam Brownback and Rep. Todd Tiahrt, Republicans all, as reported by the Seattle Post Intelligencer: "We have just met with the Air Force, and we remain unconvinced that the Airbus team will provide a better aircraft than the men and women of Boeing."
Thus opined these aerospace experts.
But oh, those Europeans! Roberts noted that much of the work will be done in France and Germany! Why, he blustered, thereby underscoring the soundbite idiocy of his party, the Pentagon's decision "supports a socialist kind of government."
This from members of a party committed to free trade, open markets and competition? Yes, it's so.
But it's not just Republicans. Here's a letter to Defense Secretary Gates from Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA): "A bipartisan delegation of Senators from Washington state and Kansas today called on Defense Secretary Robert Gates to ensure that the Air Force debriefs Boeing on the justification for their tanker contract decision this week."
It's remarkable, really, the coincidental aspect of the bipartisan nature of this missive, that members are from Washington state and Kansas. Why, could it be that both states have Boeing facilities?
Lost in the apoplectic reaction was the news, as reported by the International Herald Tribune, that "final assembly of the tankers would take place at a new plant that EADS plans to build near Mobile, Alabama. As a sweetener to its bid, EADS offered in January to build a second assembly line to produce a cargo version of the A330 for commercial use, raising the number of expected new jobs at the Alabama site to 1,300. Northrop and EADS have said the tanker program will eventually create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the United States through supplier contracts."
But the Republican Party's presidential candidate, that maverick John McCain, is--thankfully--a supporter of free trade. And if his defense of NAFTA in response to statements by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton isn't persuasive enough on philosophical grounds, why, there's always the not-so-veiled threat of payback/extortion/blackmail, call it what you will.
Said McCain, "one of our greatest assets in Afghanistan are our Canadian friends. We need our Canadian friends, and we need their continued support in Afghanistan. So what do we do? The two Democratic candidates for president say they're going to unilaterally abrogate NAFTA .... How do you think the Canadian people are going to react to that?"
Too bad McCain doesn't consult with Sen. Roberts. "Our Canadian friends," after all, have a "socialist kind of government" with universal health care.
But in defense of Republicans, we might call to mind Emerson's observation that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." Although Batleby.com reminds us that "Emerson does not explain the difference between foolish and wise consistency."
Or hypocrisy.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
The Great Game: 21st Century Style
As the US seeks to strengthen ties with India, the effort dovetails with attempts to weaken the historical ties between India and Russia (particularly with respect to weaponry) and offset China's increase in defense expenditures and foreign policy objectives.
To that end, Defense Secretary Robert Gates' visit to India was not surprising given that, as the LA Times reported, "Gates spent more time discussing New Delhi's security challenges with Beijing than with its traditional regional rival Pakistan."
Gates, of course, is an old hand at such things and thus took the path of diplomacy by saying "I don't see our improving military relationship in the region in the context of any other country, including China. These expanding relationships don't necessarily have to be directed against anyone."
***
True enough, on its face.
Yet Washington is--as it must be--mindful of the challenges China, and to a lesser extent Russia, presents going forward. From Thaindian News comes this:
"On his part, [Indian Defence Minister A.K.] Antony pointed to the close India-US engagement through forums like the Defence Policy Group, the Joint Working Group on Defence, the Military Cooperation Group, the Joint Technical Group and the Executive Steering Groups at the military-military level, saying that all of them had been meeting 'without slippages'."
"This degree of engagement hardly exists with other countries," Gates noted, adding, interestingly, that, "... they see it as we do -- a long term enterprise by two sovereign states. We are mindful of India’s long tradition of non-alignment and are respectful of that, but I think there are a lot of opportunities to expand on this relationship, and I think that was the feeling on the part of the Indian leaders that I met with, as well."
***
While the issue of the moment was the arms sale of six Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules (valued at $1 billion), Gates said he was interested in having US defense contractors bid on 126 combat aircraft valued at roughly $10 billion: "I indicated that we obviously are interested and believe we are very competitive in the selection of the new fighter ... and we ask no special treatment. We simply are pleased to have a place at the table, and we believe that in a fair competition that we have a very good case to make."
And this is in the context of the rumored, potential Indian purchase of the soon-to-be-decommissioned US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. According to BusinessWeek, "India desperately needs aircraft carriers, too, as its purchase of the Russian ship Admiral Gorshkov is delayed, and India's own carrier, the INS Viraat, is aging fast."
(A Navy spokesman dismissed the rumor, saying, "We're not doing it. The Navy has no plans to transfer the Kitty Hawk to India, nor is this a subject of discussion between our navies at any level.")
***
But beyond specific weapons purchases and potential carrier purchases/transfers is the strategic calculus regarding Russia and China. As an anonymous "senior Pentagon official" put it (notwithstanding Gates' denial that the visits to India, Indonesia and Australia weren't designed with China in mind), "there is a fundamental commonality of interests between the US and these three democracies that we have visited. There are reasons for having interoperable weapons systems ... not in an aggressive sense but certainly as a hedge."
And this hedge is to be against more than just conventional weaponry, namely missile defense. Gates: "We’re just beginning to talk about perhaps conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of missile defence and where cooperation between us might help advance that."
***
Of course, the larger issue affecting US-India bilateral relations is the civilian nuclear agreement between the two nations. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, Joe Biden, said, "time is of the essence. If we don't have the deal back with us clearly prior to the month of July it will be very difficult to ratify the deal -- not on the merits (of the deal) but on the mechanics on which our system functions." He stressed that if an agreement didn't reach Congress in time, "it is highly unlikely the next president will be able to present the same deal ... [and that] it will be renegotiated."
***
Nevertheless, US-India relations are most likely to strengthen in the coming years. As K. Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service assessed, India's suspicions and "sense of insecurity ... regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia," are easily understood.
"In fact, a strategic orientation focused on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Beijing’s military and economic support for Pakistan — support that is widely understood to have included WMD-related transfers — is a major and ongoing source of friction; past Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir position has added to the discomfort of Indian leaders. New Delhi takes note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction of military facilities on the Indian Ocean. The two countries also have competed for energy resources to feed their rapidly growing economies; India’s relative poverty puts New Delhi at a significant disadvantage in such competition.
Analysts taking a realist political theory perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of 'encirclement' or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s regionwide influence."
That alone would explain a strengthening of US-India relations.
And so the "Great Game" continues.
It's just a shame its played by wasting such vast resources.
To that end, Defense Secretary Robert Gates' visit to India was not surprising given that, as the LA Times reported, "Gates spent more time discussing New Delhi's security challenges with Beijing than with its traditional regional rival Pakistan."
Gates, of course, is an old hand at such things and thus took the path of diplomacy by saying "I don't see our improving military relationship in the region in the context of any other country, including China. These expanding relationships don't necessarily have to be directed against anyone."
***
True enough, on its face.
Yet Washington is--as it must be--mindful of the challenges China, and to a lesser extent Russia, presents going forward. From Thaindian News comes this:
"On his part, [Indian Defence Minister A.K.] Antony pointed to the close India-US engagement through forums like the Defence Policy Group, the Joint Working Group on Defence, the Military Cooperation Group, the Joint Technical Group and the Executive Steering Groups at the military-military level, saying that all of them had been meeting 'without slippages'."
"This degree of engagement hardly exists with other countries," Gates noted, adding, interestingly, that, "... they see it as we do -- a long term enterprise by two sovereign states. We are mindful of India’s long tradition of non-alignment and are respectful of that, but I think there are a lot of opportunities to expand on this relationship, and I think that was the feeling on the part of the Indian leaders that I met with, as well."
***
While the issue of the moment was the arms sale of six Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules (valued at $1 billion), Gates said he was interested in having US defense contractors bid on 126 combat aircraft valued at roughly $10 billion: "I indicated that we obviously are interested and believe we are very competitive in the selection of the new fighter ... and we ask no special treatment. We simply are pleased to have a place at the table, and we believe that in a fair competition that we have a very good case to make."
And this is in the context of the rumored, potential Indian purchase of the soon-to-be-decommissioned US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. According to BusinessWeek, "India desperately needs aircraft carriers, too, as its purchase of the Russian ship Admiral Gorshkov is delayed, and India's own carrier, the INS Viraat, is aging fast."
(A Navy spokesman dismissed the rumor, saying, "We're not doing it. The Navy has no plans to transfer the Kitty Hawk to India, nor is this a subject of discussion between our navies at any level.")
***
But beyond specific weapons purchases and potential carrier purchases/transfers is the strategic calculus regarding Russia and China. As an anonymous "senior Pentagon official" put it (notwithstanding Gates' denial that the visits to India, Indonesia and Australia weren't designed with China in mind), "there is a fundamental commonality of interests between the US and these three democracies that we have visited. There are reasons for having interoperable weapons systems ... not in an aggressive sense but certainly as a hedge."
And this hedge is to be against more than just conventional weaponry, namely missile defense. Gates: "We’re just beginning to talk about perhaps conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of missile defence and where cooperation between us might help advance that."
***
Of course, the larger issue affecting US-India bilateral relations is the civilian nuclear agreement between the two nations. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, Joe Biden, said, "time is of the essence. If we don't have the deal back with us clearly prior to the month of July it will be very difficult to ratify the deal -- not on the merits (of the deal) but on the mechanics on which our system functions." He stressed that if an agreement didn't reach Congress in time, "it is highly unlikely the next president will be able to present the same deal ... [and that] it will be renegotiated."
***
Nevertheless, US-India relations are most likely to strengthen in the coming years. As K. Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service assessed, India's suspicions and "sense of insecurity ... regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia," are easily understood.
"In fact, a strategic orientation focused on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Beijing’s military and economic support for Pakistan — support that is widely understood to have included WMD-related transfers — is a major and ongoing source of friction; past Chinese support for Pakistan’s Kashmir position has added to the discomfort of Indian leaders. New Delhi takes note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction of military facilities on the Indian Ocean. The two countries also have competed for energy resources to feed their rapidly growing economies; India’s relative poverty puts New Delhi at a significant disadvantage in such competition.
Analysts taking a realist political theory perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India. Many observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of 'encirclement' or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s regionwide influence."
That alone would explain a strengthening of US-India relations.
And so the "Great Game" continues.
It's just a shame its played by wasting such vast resources.
Saturday, February 23, 2008
African Resistance to AFRICOM
Since February 2007, when the US made public its desire to establish a central command for Africa, the project has been met in Africa with growing resistance and suspicion over what the US military really intends to do with such a command structure.
Would they build superbases chock full of military hardware and troops to protect access to oil supplies and other natural resources and, not incidentally, limit Chinese access to the same?
For many Africans, the project smacked of the first shot at re-colonizing the continent.
President Bush described AFRICOM as, "this new command [which] will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, explained AFRICOM as "a different command .... It would be a partnership, really, between military and civilians, and its principal focus would be to continue some of the activities that we're already doing to try and train peacekeeping forces so that countries in Africa and regional organizations in Africa can take more of a role in dealing with the conflicts and the problems on the continent .... I'm sure it will be an item of discussion on the trip, but I wouldn't be looking for any announcements at this point in time."
Few Africans have been persuaded by these seemingly benign descriptions. Since the US already has 1500 troops stationed in Djibouti, many wondered at the need for a second base.
In November, 2007, Robert G. Berschinski, a former intelligence officer in the US Air Force who served in Iraq, wrote a report titled AFRICOM’S DILEMMA: THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, "CAPACITY BUILDING," HUMANITARIANISM, AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN AFRICA, for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. In it, he says AFRICOM's "critics allege that the command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing the Africa’s burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.
To overcome such misgivings, AFRICOM must demonstrate a commitment to programs mutually beneficial to both African and American national interests. Yet a shrewd strategic communication campaign will not be enough to convince a skeptical African public that AFRICOM’s priorities mirror their own. Indeed, much African distrust is justified. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and East Africa, though couched in a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win 'hearts and minds,' have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on short-term objectives."
In the African blogosphere, suspicion and untrustworthiness dominate the discussion. As Sokari Ekine, who blogs at Black Looks sees it, "the question should not be whether Africa NEEDS Africom but why the US believes it NEEDS to have a military presence in Africa. We should be asking ourselves the following questions. Why does the US feels it needs a military presence in Africa? What will the US military presence consist of in terms of military hardware and numbers of personnel? How does the US intend to operate and in what circumstances will it’s forces be mobilized? In what way will the US military presence dictate or determine the price of Africa’s natural resources and who gets access to them? In what way will the US military presence infringe on the internal affairs of independent African countries and determine their foreign policy towards other AU members? How will the US military presence influence the foreign policy of independent African states towards non AU countries such as China? How will the US enhanced military presence infringe of the rights of African citizens? How will Africom impact on continental migration and the rights of the millions of Africans without citizenship and the rights of refugees?
Tristan at Contrary To Authority offered this assessment: "Africa is under a new wave of exploitation, this time, instead of people, rubber and gold, it is Chinese and American interests competing for oil."
Reasonable questions and assessments, made all the more so given global suspicions over the issue of permanent bases in Iraq.
When in Ghana, President Bush was told at a private meeting by Ghana's President John Kufuor, "you're not going to build any bases in Ghana," to which Bush responded, "I understand. Nor do we want to."
Bush added, "We do not contemplate adding new bases, in other words the purpose of this is not to add military bases. I know there are rumours in Ghana: 'All Bush is doing is coming to try to convince you to put a big military base here.' That's baloney."
But he then said: "That doesn't mean that we won't try to develop some kind of office in Africa. We haven't made our minds up. It's a new concept."
Definitely, suspicions will continue.
Would they build superbases chock full of military hardware and troops to protect access to oil supplies and other natural resources and, not incidentally, limit Chinese access to the same?
For many Africans, the project smacked of the first shot at re-colonizing the continent.
President Bush described AFRICOM as, "this new command [which] will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, explained AFRICOM as "a different command .... It would be a partnership, really, between military and civilians, and its principal focus would be to continue some of the activities that we're already doing to try and train peacekeeping forces so that countries in Africa and regional organizations in Africa can take more of a role in dealing with the conflicts and the problems on the continent .... I'm sure it will be an item of discussion on the trip, but I wouldn't be looking for any announcements at this point in time."
Few Africans have been persuaded by these seemingly benign descriptions. Since the US already has 1500 troops stationed in Djibouti, many wondered at the need for a second base.
In November, 2007, Robert G. Berschinski, a former intelligence officer in the US Air Force who served in Iraq, wrote a report titled AFRICOM’S DILEMMA: THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, "CAPACITY BUILDING," HUMANITARIANISM, AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN AFRICA, for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. In it, he says AFRICOM's "critics allege that the command demonstrates a self-serving American policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing the Africa’s burgeoning energy stocks, and countering Chinese influence.
To overcome such misgivings, AFRICOM must demonstrate a commitment to programs mutually beneficial to both African and American national interests. Yet a shrewd strategic communication campaign will not be enough to convince a skeptical African public that AFRICOM’s priorities mirror their own. Indeed, much African distrust is justified. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and East Africa, though couched in a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win 'hearts and minds,' have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on short-term objectives."
In the African blogosphere, suspicion and untrustworthiness dominate the discussion. As Sokari Ekine, who blogs at Black Looks sees it, "the question should not be whether Africa NEEDS Africom but why the US believes it NEEDS to have a military presence in Africa. We should be asking ourselves the following questions. Why does the US feels it needs a military presence in Africa? What will the US military presence consist of in terms of military hardware and numbers of personnel? How does the US intend to operate and in what circumstances will it’s forces be mobilized? In what way will the US military presence dictate or determine the price of Africa’s natural resources and who gets access to them? In what way will the US military presence infringe on the internal affairs of independent African countries and determine their foreign policy towards other AU members? How will the US military presence influence the foreign policy of independent African states towards non AU countries such as China? How will the US enhanced military presence infringe of the rights of African citizens? How will Africom impact on continental migration and the rights of the millions of Africans without citizenship and the rights of refugees?
Tristan at Contrary To Authority offered this assessment: "Africa is under a new wave of exploitation, this time, instead of people, rubber and gold, it is Chinese and American interests competing for oil."
Reasonable questions and assessments, made all the more so given global suspicions over the issue of permanent bases in Iraq.
When in Ghana, President Bush was told at a private meeting by Ghana's President John Kufuor, "you're not going to build any bases in Ghana," to which Bush responded, "I understand. Nor do we want to."
Bush added, "We do not contemplate adding new bases, in other words the purpose of this is not to add military bases. I know there are rumours in Ghana: 'All Bush is doing is coming to try to convince you to put a big military base here.' That's baloney."
But he then said: "That doesn't mean that we won't try to develop some kind of office in Africa. We haven't made our minds up. It's a new concept."
Definitely, suspicions will continue.
Friday, February 22, 2008
Wandering, Wondering NATO
NATO's creaking, uneven Afghanistan effort promises to grow yet more wobbly with Canada threatening to leave the country by the end of 2011. The BBC reports that Canada's parliament will soon vote on the proposal to extend Canada's commitment (which was to expire in February, 2009) that also includes the date for withdrawal.
The Canadian government has been under pressure to declare a withdrawal date given the refusal of several NATO member states to send troops into combat areas (Germany, chief among them).
So, has Canada's domestic debate been one of the reasons for the Taliban's resurgence? Canada's Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, thinks so. He's argued that the Taliban have watched Canada's internal politics closely, and believes an extension beyond 2009 of a Canadian presence in Afghanistan is essential: "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link."
He cited, inferentially, a suicide attack this week that killed 80 people, one of Afghanistan's deadliest since the 2001 American invasion: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."
That the Taliban is aware of NATO's commitment problems isn't surprising (they have Internet access, too), but it's a bit hard to accept that the Taliban organizes its tactics around Canadian domestic debate.
It's probably sufficient to say that NATO's half-heartedness is obvious to the entire planet, the Taliban included.
Canada's in something of a tough spot since some of its European allies, primarily Germany, won't agree to send additional troops to the Kandahar region where Canadian troops are fighting.
The Manley Report, issued in January 2008, stated the obvious in proposing "a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself."
But that doesn't seem likely and, indeed, is really the essential point. Consider the recent comments by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said she was "worried" about some NATO ally comments regarding commitment, but that she had "absolutely no time" for suggestions/demands that Germany shift combat troops from the north to the south in Afghanistan: "We decided only a few years ago on a division of labour among Nato partners," that "continuity and stability" were the order of the day, and that "we're not just digging wells and building houses; we also have a military mission."
She emphasized that a critical obstacle--"one of the biggest weaknesses"--to Afghanistan reconstruction success lay in Kabul and the Karzai government: "Afghanistan must say more clearly what it wants."
Yet, according to Reuters, "Karzai has repeatedly urged Western allies to provide more funds and resources to the Afghan security forces, rather than send more troops."
Secretary of State Rice phrased it this way: "let's be very frank about it, there are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan. And ... [that entails] overlapping authorities and many different bureaucracies and many different groups, not to mention the very fine NGOs who work here and the UN, I can understand why sometimes there may be some confusion on priorities and what needs to get done when."
In a recent poll, 61% of Canadians did not think their government "ha[d] effectively explained the mission in Afghanistan."
According to the BBC, "ask most French people about the country's troop commitment in Afghanistan, and they will have little idea what you are talking about."
And in the UK, there is uncertainty over NATO's strategy. James Arbuthnot, House of Commons Defence Committee Chair, said "we don't want to see another 9/11. [And] 90% of the heroin on our streets comes from Afghanistan, [so our] political commitment is weakened by questions about whether we are actually doing the right things to solve those two problems."
Obviously, confusion and dissatisfaction dominate debate within NATO countries over Afghanistan, regarding all elements of the "mission."
The question is, does NATO really have a mission -- comprehensively and comprehensibly understood -- in Afghanistan?
The Canadian government has been under pressure to declare a withdrawal date given the refusal of several NATO member states to send troops into combat areas (Germany, chief among them).
So, has Canada's domestic debate been one of the reasons for the Taliban's resurgence? Canada's Chief of Defense Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, thinks so. He's argued that the Taliban have watched Canada's internal politics closely, and believes an extension beyond 2009 of a Canadian presence in Afghanistan is essential: "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability. And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link."
He cited, inferentially, a suicide attack this week that killed 80 people, one of Afghanistan's deadliest since the 2001 American invasion: "I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."
That the Taliban is aware of NATO's commitment problems isn't surprising (they have Internet access, too), but it's a bit hard to accept that the Taliban organizes its tactics around Canadian domestic debate.
It's probably sufficient to say that NATO's half-heartedness is obvious to the entire planet, the Taliban included.
Canada's in something of a tough spot since some of its European allies, primarily Germany, won't agree to send additional troops to the Kandahar region where Canadian troops are fighting.
The Manley Report, issued in January 2008, stated the obvious in proposing "a Canadian strategy that integrates military, diplomatic and development actions for a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. We have recommended that some of these actions be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself."
But that doesn't seem likely and, indeed, is really the essential point. Consider the recent comments by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said she was "worried" about some NATO ally comments regarding commitment, but that she had "absolutely no time" for suggestions/demands that Germany shift combat troops from the north to the south in Afghanistan: "We decided only a few years ago on a division of labour among Nato partners," that "continuity and stability" were the order of the day, and that "we're not just digging wells and building houses; we also have a military mission."
She emphasized that a critical obstacle--"one of the biggest weaknesses"--to Afghanistan reconstruction success lay in Kabul and the Karzai government: "Afghanistan must say more clearly what it wants."
Yet, according to Reuters, "Karzai has repeatedly urged Western allies to provide more funds and resources to the Afghan security forces, rather than send more troops."
Secretary of State Rice phrased it this way: "let's be very frank about it, there are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan. And ... [that entails] overlapping authorities and many different bureaucracies and many different groups, not to mention the very fine NGOs who work here and the UN, I can understand why sometimes there may be some confusion on priorities and what needs to get done when."
In a recent poll, 61% of Canadians did not think their government "ha[d] effectively explained the mission in Afghanistan."
According to the BBC, "ask most French people about the country's troop commitment in Afghanistan, and they will have little idea what you are talking about."
And in the UK, there is uncertainty over NATO's strategy. James Arbuthnot, House of Commons Defence Committee Chair, said "we don't want to see another 9/11. [And] 90% of the heroin on our streets comes from Afghanistan, [so our] political commitment is weakened by questions about whether we are actually doing the right things to solve those two problems."
Obviously, confusion and dissatisfaction dominate debate within NATO countries over Afghanistan, regarding all elements of the "mission."
The question is, does NATO really have a mission -- comprehensively and comprehensibly understood -- in Afghanistan?
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