NATO Theorists Advocate Use of Nuclear Weapons

To be sure, NATO has had a tough time of it in Afghanistan. From the recent comments by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Canada's Manley Report, to the caveats of Germany, Spain and Italy that prevent their troops from being used in combat operations in Afghanistan's south, NATO has shown itself to be adrift strategically as well as tactically.
But a new proposal by five former generals (Gen. John Shalikashvili, former NATO commander and President Clinton's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Klaus Naumann, Germany’s former top general and former chairman of Nato’s military committee; General Henk van den Breemen, ex-Dutch chief of staff; Admiral Jacques Lanxade, former French chief of staff; and Lord Inge, British field marshal and former chief of the general staff and the defense staff) seeks to remedy NATO's weaknesses, titled Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World (Renewing Transatlantic Partnership), by suggesting (among a great many other things in their 150 page proposal) that NATO be prepared to use, preemptively, nuclear weapons against nations that either currently possess or seek to acquire such weapons:

We are ... no longer preoccupied with the traditional principle of destruction, which dominated strategic thinking from the early 19th century. The new principle – in line with the progress of technology–is the principle of minimum damage and victory
through paralysis, involving the surgical use of all available instruments of power.
Simultaneously observing proportionality and damage limitation will become extremely difficult in cases where the use of nuclear weapons must be considered. The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly existential dangers. At first glance, it may appear disproportionate; but taking account of the damage that it might prevent, it could well be proportionate. Despite the immense power of destruction possessed by nuclear weapons, the principle of damage limitation remains valid and must be kept in mind. Indeed, it was one of the
principles that governed NATO’s nuclear planning during the Cold War.

An astonishing proposal, no? It is a piece of the fundamental reform advocated by these five retired generals and, in the context of fundamental reform, advises NATO to dispense with the Cold War definition of deterrence (that of "punishment, [or] the threat of total destruction") and replace it with "a new deterrence, which conveys a single, unambiguous message to all enemies: There is not, and never will be, any place where you can feel safe; a relentless effort will be made to pursue you and deny you any options you might develop to inflict damage upon us."

This stands in stark contrast to recent commentary suggesting the eventual elimination of such weapons as the preferred prescription to the daunting challenge of proliferation.
As Andy Grotto at Arms Control Wonk phrased it, "How could a renewed emphasis on the preemptive use of nuclear weapons possibly promote NATO unity?!"
But clearly the ex-generals' proposal is predicated on a belief that the international tools used to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons has failed and will remain ineffectual: "No institution and no nation is capable of responding to these dangers and risks on its own; and just a cursory glance at our international organisations leads us to ask whether we have a proper basis for coordinated action. Unfortunately, it would appear that we do not."
And:
"Regrettably, nuclear weapons – and with them the option of first use – are indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world.
On the contrary, the risk of further proliferation is imminent and, with it, the danger that nuclear war fighting, albeit limited in scope, might become possible. This development must be prevented. It should therefore be kept in mind that technology could produce options that go beyond the traditional role of nuclear weapons in preventing a nuclear armed opponent from using nuclear weapons. In sum, nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain
an element of any modern strategy."

James K Galbraith, professor of government/business relations at the Lyndon B Johnson school of public affairs, at the University of Texas at Austin, editorialized in the Guardian in a piece titled "A criminal Idea," that "to attack some new nuclear pretender now would certainly constitute the 'waging of a war of aggression ...' That's a crime. And the planning and preparation for such a war is no less a crime than the war itself."
The authors' response to this argument is "that international law is not merely codified law, but is also customary law, which is shaped by actions taken and unwritten standards of interpretation and legitimacy."

NATO's difficulties in Afghanistan, which really amount to a lack of political will to determine what the objectives of NATO ought to be in that country and then implement those objectives, might very well call for a reform of that institution in a West that increasingly is unable to muster political resolve to deter fanaticism.
But the implications of this "grand strategy" are so troublesome that it suggests a response that throws the baby out with the bathwater.
The author argue that "it is important ... to have dominance over the opponent’s ability to calculate his risks. It is a very important element of strategy to keep things unpredictable for the opponent, who must never be able to know, or calculate, what action we will take. It is essential to maintain this dimension of psychological warfare by instilling fear in an opponent, to retain an element of surprise and thus deny him the opportunity of calculating the risk."
Yet asymmetry and unpredictability work both ways. How would China respond? What would their policy be to deter what they perceive as western aggression under certain circumstances? How would Russia respond?
Would Pakistan suspect NATO and India of concluding a secret agreement between them? Would Pakistan decide to use their weapons first for fear of being a likely target of this new doctrine?
The implications of such a policy are as unknown and unpredictable as they are deeply disturbing morally and ethically.